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Three Essays on the Economics of Education
Tong Geng
This dissertation consists of three essays studying the impact of school organiza-
tion, incentives, and complementarity on education production. The identification
strategy relies on exogenous variation generated from several education policies in
New York City, the largest school district in the United States, and the key out-
comes include students’ standardized test scores and subjective evaluation of their
educational experiences.
The first chapter examines the complementarity of incentives in education pro-
duction. Many production activities require cooperation between agents in an orga-
nization, and incentive alignment may take advantage of complementarities in such
activities. This paper investigates such a possibility by examining two education
policies that were implemented in New York City: a grade retention policy that in-
centivizes students and an accountability scheme that incentivizes schools. I employ
double- and triple-difference strategies to estimate the individual and combined ef-
fects of these policies. The policies alone appear to have generated either modest or
insignificant improvements in student outcomes. Combined, however, the retention
and accountability policies led to a substantial increase in math test scores and re-
ductions in student absences and suspension rates; the effect on English test scores
is positive but not robust. These results underscore the value of using incentive
alignment to realize complementarities in organizations.
The second chapter, co-authored with Jonah Rockoff, looks at the effect of repeat-
ing a grade on students’ test scores and subjective evaluation of their educational ex-
periences. When a student’s academic knowledge or preparation is well below that of
his or her age group, a common policy response is to have that student repeat a grade
level and join the following, younger cohort. Evaluating the impacts of grade reten-
tion is made complicated by the potential incomparability of (1) retained students
to promoted peers and (2) outcomes measured differently across grade levels. In this
paper, we use novel data from New York City to ask whether parents’ and students’
self-reported educational experiences are significantly affected by grade retention. We
take advantage of surveys that ask the same questions regardless of a student’s grade
level, and implement a regression discontinuity approach, identifying causal effects
on students retained due to missed cutoffs on math and English exams. We find
that parental satisfaction with the quality of their child’s education and students’
sense of personal safety both improve significantly over the three years we observe
from the time of retention. Our findings suggest that the stringent and somewhat
controversial test-based retention policies enacted in New York had positive effects
on the educational experience of these marginal students.
The third chapter reviews and reassesses the overall impact of Children First,
which consists of a series of educational policies during Bloomberg’s administration
in New York City. To expand our understanding of Children First, I first outline
the key components of this education reform and review the literature on Children
First and its associated policies. I also reassess the overall impact of Children First
through the synthetic control method and find weak effects of this reform on student
performance. Lastly, I provide an economic analysis to understand the advantages
and weaknesses of Children First.
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Chapter 1
The Complementarity of Incentive Policies in Education:
Evidence from New York City
1.1 Introduction
Organizations frequently adopt incentive policies to motivate agents to reach certain
goals. Attaining these goals often requires coordination between multiple agents,
which can potentially lead to complementarities between different incentive policies
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). Such complementarities are often overlooked but
can be important for efficient production. In education, where instruction typically
requires collaboration between staff and students, combining incentive policies might
take advantage of a potential complementarity in human capital production.
This paper investigates such a possibility by examining two types of commonly en-
acted incentive policies in education: an accountability scheme focused on school-side
incentives and a grade retention policy emphasizing student-side incentives.1 These
two types of incentive policies may produce complementary effects if there is a com-
plementarity between school effort and student effort in human capital production.
1The No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 required each state to bring students to a certain
proficiency level. As a result, many states adopted accountability schemes to increase schools’
efforts to improve students’ test scores. In addition, sixteen states implemented grade retention
policies (Rose, 2012), which may motivate students to exert more effort to avoid being retained.
1
This complementarity would appear if, for example, better prepared instructors are
more effective at improving more attentive students’ test scores. To my knowledge,
no previous study has examined this complementarity, despite the great number of
studies evaluating each type of policy in isolation. The lack of evidence may reflect
that the identification of such a complementarity is challenging: It requires a suitable
overlap of the two arguably exogenous policies, so that their individual and combined
effects can both be estimated (Almond and Mazumder, 2013; Athey and Stern, 1998).
In the current paper, I take advantage of the staggered implementation of two pol-
icy reforms in New York City (NYC), which allows for estimation of their individual
and combined effects. In 2004, NYC started implementing a grade retention policy
on a subset of students in several grade levels, which required them to demonstrate a
minimum proficiency level on standardized tests in both math and English Language
Arts (English) to advance to the next grade. In 2007, NYC initiated an account-
ability scheme for all schools that placed additional weight on the performance of
certain low-achieving students within each grade and school. Schools that were rated
poorly under this system faced risk of closure. I employ double- and triple-difference
strategies to estimate the individual and combined effects of these policies.2
My empirical analysis begins with the retention policy alone (prior to the intro-
duction of the accountability scheme). The control group combines students who
were exempt from the policy (special education students and English language learn-
2 NYC is the largest school district in the United States, and this paper uses administrative data
that include several key variables: (1) standardized math and English test scores; (2) students’ days
of absence and suspension, which can be used to approximate student effort; and (3) their assigned
teachers’ experience levels and days of absence, which can be used to capture an important part of
school effort/resources.
2
ers) and students with high prior test scores, who faced little risk of failing the test.
Using a synthetic control method and a difference-in-difference strategy, I find an
improvement in at-risk students’ math test scores (10% of a standard deviation) but
no significant effects on other outcomes.
The analysis then turns to the effects of the accountability scheme alone by fo-
cusing on grade levels that were not subject to the retention policy.3 Although the
scheme awarded points for improvements in all students’ test scores, NYC assigned
more weight to improvements in the test scores of students who scored in the lowest
third in each subject, grade, and school, and the city provided schools with a list
of such students. This “lowest third” element of the accountability scheme allows
me to investigate the effects of additional incentives on schools’ allocation of effort
by comparing lowest-third students with top-two-thirds students within each subject,
grade, and school. The results show a relative drop in math-lowest-third students’
math test scores (10% of a standard deviation) and a relative increase in English-
lowest-third students’ English test scores (4% of a standard deviation).4 The effects
on other outcomes are small and mostly insignificant.
Last but not least, the analysis examines the complementarity of the two policies,
focusing on lowest-third students who were also subject to the retention policy using
a triple-difference model. I find that math-lowest-third students who were subject
to the retention policy exhibit a large improvement in math test scores (34% of a
3Since the policy retained more low-achieving students, changes in student composition are a
potential concern for the analysis. However, these changes do not seem to be influencing the results.
4Throughout the paper, I refer to students in the lowest third in math as math-lowest-third
students and those in the lowest third in English as English-lowest-third students. These groups are
correlated but different.
3
standard deviation) and a decrease in both absences (0.48 days) and suspension rates
(0.68 percentage points) when both the retention and accountability policies were in
place.5 Distributional analyses suggest that part of the estimated effect on lowest-
third students comes at the expense of higher-achieving students. The analysis of
English-lowest-third students suggests a positive and smaller effect on English test
scores (8% of a standard deviation), but it is not robust. This finding is consistent
with the overall small and insignificant effects of each policy in isolation on English.
Alignment of student and teacher effort may explain the complementarity of these
policies. A decrease in math-lowest-third students’ absences and suspension rates
suggests their increased effort. The distributional effects also suggest that teachers
may have allocated more effort/attention to math-lowest-third students. Additionally,
there is no evidence that lowest-third students were assigned to teachers with more
experience or fewer absences, or to smaller classes, under these policies. All of these
findings support the interpretation that student and teacher behaviors are driving
the results.
This paper depicts incentive alignment as a potential instrument for taking advan-
tage of organizational complementarities, and it contributes to a small but growing
literature on organizational practices and complementarities in schools (Bloom et al.,
2015; Jacob and Rockoff, 2012; Mbiti et al., 2016) and a larger literature on or-
ganizational complementarities in other settings (Brynjolfsson and Milgrom, 2013;
5 The complementary effect on math test scores seems quite large compared with effects found
in several related studies on school accountability schemes, which represented roughly 10% to 15%
of a standard deviation (e.g., Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010; Rockoff and Turner, 2010). Unlike these
studies, which estimate the overall effect of a scheme, this paper examines a relative change induced
by the lowest-third element and does not distinguish a likely shift of effort across students.
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Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). The results support the importance of complementar-
ity between student effort and school/teacher effort in human capital production and
underscore the importance of jointly considering all agents’ incentives in designing
effective education policies.6
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the retention policy
and the accountability scheme in greater detail. Section 3 describes the data. Sections
4, 5, and 6 present the empirical strategy and results for the retention policy, the
accountability scheme, and their interaction, respectively. Section 7 concludes the
paper with a discussion of the findings and their implications.
1.2 Background
This section presents background information on each policy and how it motivates
the empirical strategy used to identify the policies’ individual and combined effects.
In 2004, NYC started implementing a grade retention policy that required a subset
of students in some grade levels to attain a minimal proficiency level in both math-
ematics and English to advance to the next grade. In 2007, NYC initiated a school
accountability scheme in all public schools that associated rewards and punishments
with students’ test scores; one element of the scheme assigned additional weight to
the performance of lowest-third students in each subject, grade, and school.
6A notable study with related findings was conducted by Behrman et al. (2015), who found a
greater impact from providing both individual and group monetary incentives to students, teachers,
and school administrators than from providing only individual incentives to students and teachers
through a social experiment in 88 Mexican high schools. Another study that shares the spirit of this
paper is by Johnson and Jackson (2017), who found that Head Start and school financing reforms
are complementary in human capital production.
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Retention Policy
NYC implemented a grade retention policy for all general education students in 3rd
grade in 2004, 5th grade in 2005, 7th grade (English only) in 2006, 7th grade (English
and math) in 2007, and 8th grade in 2009 (McCombs, Kirby, and Mariano, 2009).7
The retention policy required students to achieve a proficiency level of 2 out of 4 on
both math and English tests, which all students between 3rd and 8th grade in NYC
public schools are required to take in spring.8 Students in English language learner
(ELL) programs, special education programs, and charter schools were exempt from
this policy.
NYC also provided all students in high-stakes grades the opportunity to attend
Saturday schools, a program specifically focused on test preparation, regardless of
their exemption status and prior test scores. In practice, 16% of students attended
this program, and they attended 40% of sessions (ibid.). Among attendees, one third
of the students were actually at risk of failing the tests (with prior test scores below
3), another third had test scores above 3, and the final third were students exempt
from the retention policy.
Students who failed to achieve the minimal proficiency level on the spring tests
were required to attend summer school and pass the tests in August in order to be
promoted to the next grade. Students who failed the tests in spring or August could
7All years refer to the year of the spring semester.
8Students in 8th grade were also required to pass tests in science and social studies, which only
4th and 8th graders take. In addition, 8th graders who are overage or who have been previously
retained in middle school may be promoted on appeal in August if they demonstrate effort toward
meeting the promotion standards.
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also be promoted if they were able to demonstrate sufficient proficiency through their
portfolios and coursework to their teachers and principals, who made all retention
decisions. An appeal process was available for these students and their parents.
This paper hereafter limits the analysis to students in 4th, 5th, and 6th grades,
with 5th grade being a high-stakes grade for the retention policy. Third grade did not
count toward a major component in the accountability scheme and is thus excluded
(see next section for more detail). The accountability scheme and another major
change confound the analysis of the retention policy in isolation on 7th and 8th
grades. Since NYC implemented the scheme in 2007, evaluating the retention policy
for 7th grade (in math) and 8th grade is confounded. In 2006, two major policy
changes occurred, which confounds the analysis of the retention policy for 7th grade
(English). First, NYC stopped using the city tests for 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th grade
and adopted the New York State Tests; Students in 4th and 8th grade had been
taking the state tests since 1999. Second, New York state accountability measure
(as part of No Child Left Behind) was extended to 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th grade; the
other two grades were subject to the state accountability measure since 2004.9
To demonstrate the effects of the policy change, I show that (1) retention risks
conditional on failing the tests increased after the policy in a regression-discontinuity
design, and (2) the increase occurred exactly at the time when the policy was imple-
mented in a time-series analysis.
9The state accountability measure was based on an index that counts twice the number of
students who had a test score above 3 and counts twice the number of students who had a test score
above 2. The state also required schools with low indexes to take certain actions. However, this
state-level policy does not seem to have any large empirical impact on my analysis.
7
Figure 1.1 shows that if students subject to the policy failed the test, their prob-
ability of retention increased after the retention policy. The x-axis is an index that
measures the distance between a student’s spring test score and the cutoff score for
passing the test: indexist = scoreist− cutoffgst, where scoreist is student i’s April test
score in subject s in year t and cutoffgst is the cutoff score in subject s for passing
the test in year t and grade g. Failing a test is equivalent to indexist < 0 and is
indicated by the gray vertical line in the figure. Prior to the grade retention policy,
retention risks were overall low and loosely connected to failing the tests; the policy
increased the probability of retention at the cutoff by 20% in math and 10% in En-
glish, which indicates that a typical student saw passing math as more binding than
passing English in the promotion standard.
Figure 1.2 converts Figure 1.1 into a time series and shows that the increase
in retention risks occurred in 2005, when the policy was implemented. Each point
restricts the observations to the students in Figure 1.1 and represents the probability
of retention conditional on failing the test in each subject-grade-year cell — that is,
Prob(Retention|Fail)− Prob(Retention|Pass).10 The is a clear jump for 5th grade
but not for other grades when the policy took effect.11
The more demanding promotion criteria may have motivated students, especially
those at risk of failing the tests, to exert additional effort to avoid attending summer
school and being retained, since repeating a grade is associated with stigma and pres-
10The restriction deals with the change in the distribution of students who failed the test. It is
also possible to estimate the discontinuity at the cutoff in Figure 1.1, but the results are noisier due
to changes in the cutoff score in some years.
11In contrast, Appendix Figure A1 and A2 show that the policy did not affect the exempt
students.
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sure from peers and teachers (Andrew, 2014; Byrnes, 1989). The retention policy’s
incentives for school staff, however, were small for three reasons. First, there were
no direct consequences associated with retaining students for teachers or principals.
Second, public schools are fully funded by NYC, and retaining students does not im-
pose additional financial burdens on schools. Third, retention rates were not public
information, and there were few concerns regarding the impact of retaining students
on school reputation.
The analysis of the incentive effect is related to Koppensteiner (2014), which found
removing a retention policy in Brazil produced a disincentive effect, and is in contrast
to most other studies on grade retention policies, which have evaluated the effects of
repeating a grade (Eren, Depew, and Barnes, 2017; Geng and Rockoff, 2016; Jacob
and Lefgren, 2004a; Ozek, 2015).
Accountability Scheme
In 2007, NYC implemented an accountability scheme for all public schools except
those that only serve special education students. The scheme linked accountability
ratings (letter grades ranging from A to F) with rewards and punishments.12 High-
performing (A and B) schools were awarded additional funding, while low-performing
(D and F) schools faced substantial consequences, such as potential loss of students
through a special transfer program, removal of the principal, and even closure.
The letter grades were based on three components: school environment (15% of
12The scheme experienced a major reform in 2010 and was removed in 2013.
9
the overall score), student performance (25%), and student progress (60%).13 School
environment scores were based on student attendance and survey responses from
students, parents, and teachers; student performance scores were based on students’
test scores; student progress scores were based on improvements in students’ test
scores. The calculation of student progress scores requires two years of test score
data, the second of which is for a higher grade level. As a result, students in 3rd
grade or repeating a grade are not counted in the student progress component.14
Schools’ scores on all three components were first compared with scores of a set
of similar schools within each school type (“peer schools”) and then with scores of
all schools citywide, then converted into an overall score, and finally assigned a letter
grade.15 The use of peer schools was intended to incentivize schools of all achievement
levels.16
To examine the allocation of school effort within each school, I take advantage
of one specific element in the student progress score: improvements in the school-
wide lowest-third students’ test scores, which counted for 15% more points than
improvements in other students’ test scores in the overall score. School-wide lowest-
13Appendix Figure A3 presents each component of the accountability grade rubric and its
weight in calculating the overall score. Full documentation can be found at http://schools.nyc.
gov/Accountability/tools/report/ProgressReport_2007-2013.htm.
14Since retained students do not count toward this component and schools had some discretion
on which students to retain, retention patterns may have changed after the accountability scheme
was implemented. However, the overall low retention rate (2%) makes this potential change unlikely
to be driving the main results. This change may be itself an interesting phenomenon, and there is
a separate analysis on this topic in the appendix.
15School types include elementary schools, K-8 schools, middle schools, and high schools.
16Schools could also earn extra credit for substantially improving test scores among several stu-
dent subgroups: ELL students, special education students, and students scoring in the city’s lowest
third the previous year.
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third students are defined as those who scored in the lowest third in each subject,
grade, and school in the previous year.
This element brings two more advantages to the identification strategy. First,
since it varies at the grade level, the analysis may identify the effect of the accountabil-
ity scheme on lowest-third students separately across grades. Moreover, lowest-third
students are defined within each school and cover a wide range of student character-
istics and achievement levels. As a result, it is unlikely that other concurrent policies
are driving the effects on lowest-third students.17
NYC actively encouraged schools to focus on lowest-third students. For example,
NYC sent out an annual list of lowest-third students to assist each school in identify-
ing these students and providing additional assistance to them.18 Other elements in
the accountability scheme are symmetric, giving equal weight to all students. There-
fore, the lowest-third element may direct additional instructional focus and attention
toward lowest-third students in each school.19
One limitation is that this element only allows me to identify the relative change
between lowest-third and top-two-thirds students. However, one thing to note is that
identifying the effect of the whole accountability scheme in NYC is almost impos-
sible, with virtually all schools being held accountable and compared with a set of
similar schools. In addition, understanding how schools allocate effort is of great
17Other policies may include proficiency counting at the state level as part of No Child Left
Behind and student performance scores in this accountability scheme.
18The list is not available to the author and is thus manually generated from the data.
19One potential concern is that the student performance component may interfere with the ad-
ditional incentives on lowest third students. I test such possibilities in the empirical analysis and
find no evidence.
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importance for educational equity and many studies (e.g., Deming et al., 2016; Ladd
and Lauen, 2010; Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010) have examined the distributional
effects of accountability schemes. Lastly, the scheme in NYC mimics a common situ-
ation in education generally: Agents face multiple tasks (Dixit, 2002) and overlapping
incentives (Fryer Jr, 2013).
The overall design of the accountability scheme in NYC also differs from several
accountability policies in other settings, which provides an opportunity to examine a
different incentive system. Accountability systems typically implement two models: a
status model emphasizes the number of students attaining a certain proficiency level;
a growth model emphasizes improvements in students’ test scores.20 Many studies
focus on the distributional effect of a status model (Macartney, McMillan, and Petron-
ijevic, 2015; Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010; Reback, 2008) and varying accountability
pressure on students’ test scores (Deming et al., 2016; Reback, Rockoff, and Schwartz,
2014), and they find evidence of teachers’ targeted effort on “bubble students”, who
have the greatest potential in contributing to reaching the accountability require-
ment.21 In contrast, the NYC system includes both models and provides additional
incentives to lowest-third students.
20See Figlio and Loeb (2011) for a more thorough discussion of these two models.
21A few studies evaluated the effects of receiving different letter grades from the accountability
scheme on students’ test scores and survey responses (Chiang, 2009; Rockoff and Turner, 2010;
Rouse et al., 2013).
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1.3 Data
The data include individual-level administrative records of all students with linked
teacher characteristics from grade 3 to grade 8 in NYC public schools from 1999
to 2009. These records contain each student’s demographic characteristics, school
and class identifiers, scale scores in math and English, days absent from school, and
suspensions, as well as teachers’ demographic characteristics, experience levels, and
absence records.
The empirical analysis focuses on 4th, 5th, and 6th grades because other grades
either did not count toward the accountability scheme or did not allow me to cleanly
identify the retention policy in isolation.22 In order to analyze the interaction of the
two policies, the main analysis focuses on students who are subject to the retention
policy and include the exempt students in certain estimations.
Certain observations are dropped from the analysis. Student records with missing
current test scores in either math or English (6% of the data) are dropped to minimize
the potential issue of selection into testing. Since prior covariates are used throughout
the analysis, the first year of data (1999) and student with missing prior records (6%
of the data).
Panels A, B, C, and D in Appendix Figure A4 present the percentage of exempt
and eligible students who took the tests in each year, separately for math and English.
Panels A and B show that the overall test-taking rate for eligible students was high
(around 95%) and increased smoothly over the analysis period, with a small jump of
22A separate analysis of these grades is available upon request.
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2% in 2003, possibly due to the passing of No Child Left Behind. Panels C and D
indicate that many more exempt students started taking the math tests (20% more)
in 2003 and the English tests (30% more) in 2007. Because of the data restriction, the
composition change in the test-taking exempt students is not a concern until 2008
(see Panel E), two years after a subset of exempt students started taking tests in
both subjects. Panel E shows the percentage of exempt students in each year after
imposing the data restriction. There are two noteworthy patterns. First, some more
(1.5% to 2%) students became exempt in 2002 and 2007. Since nonexempt students
consist of more than 90% of the sample, this change might mostly complicate the
analysis of exempt students. In the later analysis, this change does not seem to be
empirically important. Second, many exempt students appeared in the dataset after
2008 because they started taking both tests in 2007, and the data restriction may
only exclude them in 2007.
The analysis includes three types of outcomes. The first type directly measures
academic achievement and includes math and English test scores. The second type
measures students’ behaviors, including days of absence and suspensions. Although
teachers and principals have some discretion in the notice of suspension, the discipline
code in NYC requires documentary evidence and witness testimony for suspension and
provides a comprehensive list of relevant infractions, limiting flexibility in suspending
students. Therefore, suspensions still partially account for student behaviors. The
last type of “outcome” concerns teacher characteristics, including teachers’ experience
levels and absences.
Test scores across grades and years use different scales and are converted into
14
proficiency ratings according to the rule set by the accountability scheme. The rule
converts each scale score to a measure from 1 to 4.5, with a continuous distribution
of scores within each proficiency level. Specifically, the rule is defined as follows:
RescaledTSist = [
RawTSist −Min(RawTSglst)
Max(RawTSglst)−Min(RawTSglst) ]− 0.01×1(l < 4)+Leveligst
in which RescaledTSigst represents the rescaled test score of student i in subject
s and year t, RawTSist is the raw test score of the student, Min(RawTSglst) and
Max(RawTSglst) are the minimum and maximum scores at student i’s proficiency
level l, and Levelist is student i’s proficiency level. In the case of Leveligst = 4, the
expression in brackets is divided by 2. This conversion rule allows me to preserve the
variation in the means and standard deviations of the scale scores across years and
grades.
Absence and suspension records are censored to minimize the influence of extreme
values. Both absences and suspension records are censored at the 99th percentile to
have a maximum of 70 days of absences and an indicator of ever being suspended
during each academic year.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics on the eligible students for the whole sample,
school-wide lowest-third students in either subject, and school-wide top-two-thirds
students in both subjects. Although lowest-third students are on average lower-
achieving in all dimensions, the differences are not huge.23 Appendix Figure A5
23In this table, teacher characteristics are the average of two subjects for simplicity. The difference
in teacher experience seems to be driven by tracking within each school. For example, some schools
have classes that contained no lowest-third students.
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further demonstrates this argument by showing the kernel density of test scores for
lowest-third students and top-two-thirds students: There is a large overlapping in the
test scores of these two types of students.
1.4 The Effects of the Retention Policy Alone
This section uses a difference-in-difference (DID) strategy with both a simple control
group and a synthetic control method to estimate the incentive effects of the retention
policy in isolation.
Identification Strategy
To identify the incentive effects of the retention policy, I focus on students who are
subject to the policy and at risk of failing the test in the grade subject to the policy
(5th grade). According to the definition used by the Department of Education at
NYC, students who had a prior test score below 3 are at risk of failing the test.
Data validate this argument: Appendix Figure A6 plots the empirical probability of
failing the test against prior test scores in 5th grade, and students with prior test
scores above 3 have a close-to-zero probability of failing the test. Therefore, the
identification strategy follows this definition.
The choice of an appropriate control group is difficult. A reasonable control group
should come from the same grade to account for the availability of Saturday schools
and different tests across grades — that is, students who are either exempt from the
policy or have no risk of failing the test. However, both of these groups have no
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overlap with at-risk students and might fail to satisfy the parallel trend assumption.
DID results with a control group containing both types of students show that
the pre-treatment trend on test scores is not satisfactory. The empirical specification
follows a DID model for 5th-grade students with year and group fixed effects prior to
the accountability scheme:
Aist = β0 + γ
′Xit + δt + β1Riskist + β2Riskist ∗RetPolit + ϵist (1.1)
In this equation, Aist is an outcome of interest in year t; Xit includes ethnicity,
free lunch status, gender, and an indicator of repeating a grade; δt are year fixed
effects; Riskist is an indicator of at-risk students in subject s; Riskist ∗ RetPolt is
an interaction term between Riskist and a dummy of implementing the policy.24
Standard errors are clustered at the school-year level to account for idiosyncratic
shocks within each school-year cell. β2 estimates the incentive effect of the retention
policy.
To address this challenge, I also adopt a synthetic control method (Abadie, Dia-
mond, and Hainmueller, 2010) to select a subset of students from the control group
in the DID specification. The “donor pool” is formed by splitting the control group
into bins of prior outcomes. Prior math and English test scores are each divided into
35 groups with 0.1 points per group to estimate the effect on scores; prior absences
are divided into 35 groups with 2 days per group to estimate the effect on absences
and suspensions.
24When I estimate the effect on absences and suspension rates, a student at risk in either math
or English is considered at risk.
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The matching covariates include pre-treatment average of current and prior out-
comes, along with percentage of students who are white, black, Hispanic, Asian,
female, receiving free lunch, and repeating a grade. The matching algorithm uses a
Stata package developed by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2014), which mini-
mizes the pre-treatment mean square prediction error (MSPE). However, the match-
ing for teacher characteristics is unsatisfactory, and the graphical evidence looks
messy. Therefore, estimation for these outcomes also includes the DID strategy with
a simple control.
Inference is based on assigning a treatment status to each member of the donor
pool and comparing the treatment effects on the actual treated group with the
placebo treatment effects on the members of the donor pool. Such information is
summarized in a ratio test that follows Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015):
P (Post-RMSPEPre-RMSPE treat <
Post-RMSPE
Pre-RMSPE control), where Post- and Pre-RMSPE are post- and pre-
treatment root mean square prediction error. Intuitively, a large Post-RMSPEPre-RMSPE stands
for a large treatment effect, which should be larger for the treatment group than for
the control group. Therefore, the effect is more unlikely to occur if this probability
is lower.25 Loosely speaking, this ratio resembles the p-value in hypothesis testing.
The analysis focuses on the years between 2002 and 2006 to isolate the effects of
the retention policy. Excluding pre-2002 years accounts for the compositional change
shown in Appendix Figure A4; excluding post-2006 years avoids the interaction with
the accountability scheme. There are potentially two issues associated with the year
25Members with lowest/highest prior outcomes are dropped due to inability to match them with
a synthetic control group with similar prior outcomes.
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2006. First, the policy retained more low-achieving 5th graders in 2005, so 5th graders
in 2006 were more negatively selected, and 6th graders in 2006 were more positively
selected. Second, the adoption of the state tests may differentially affect the treatment
group and the synthetic control group. These two factors may confound the results
in 2006.
To corroborate the results, I also show a placebo test that uses the same technique
on grades that were not subject to the policy and a distributional effect that compares
the eligible students (both at-risk and not-at-risk ones) with the exempt students.
Graphical Evidence and Inference
Appendix Figure A7 plots coefficients with 95% confidence intervals from an event-
study version of Equation 1.1, which calculates β2 for each year. Panels A and B
present the results for math and English test scores and show a clear difference in the
pre-treatment trends for the treatment and control groups, which prevents conclusions
from being drawn the figure. Panels C and D seem to have a satisfactory pre-trend
and show no effects on absences and suspension rates.
Figure 1.3 plots the difference between treatment group and the synthetic control
(red line) and the difference between each member of the donor pool and its synthetic
control as inference (gray lines). Panels A and B present the results for math and
English test scores, and the red line shows a fairly flat pre-treatment trend for the
treatment group. Post-treatment differences suggest an increase in both math and
English test scores for at-risk students. Inference suggests that the improvement in
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math is possibly “significant” but the one in English is likely not — several members
in the donor pool show larger effects. Consistent with the graphical evidence, the
ratio test for math test scores is 0% and that for English test scores is 14%. Panels
C and D show no discernible effects on absences and suspension rates; the ratios are
38% and 61%, respectively.
Appendix Figure A8 presents a placebo test focusing on the grades not subject
to the policy (4th and 6th grades) and shows no clear change in the year when the
policy was implemented. All ratios are above 10%.
One concern is whether the policy only affected at-risk students, since teachers’
efforts and Saturday schools may have benefited other students. To explore this possi-
bility, I examine the distributional effects on eligible students, using exempt students
as a control group.26 Since these two groups of students might be incomparable, such
evidence is suggestive.27 Appendix Figure A9 presents the distributional effects in a
change-in-change graph during 2003 and 2005. The x-axis represents prior test scores,
which are divided into bins of 0.2 points each. Each point represents a difference-
in-difference estimate of the retention policy for each bin of students. Above the
horizontal line stands for improvements in the outcome. To the right of the black line
are students who faced little risk of failure. The pattern that there is little evidence
of improvement in the test scores of students who are not at risk of failing the test
(those with prior test scores above 3) reassures us that the policy did not seem to
26It is also possible to examine the effects on exempt students in 5th grade, using exempt students
in 4th and 6th grades as a control. However, because students take different tests in different grades,
it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from this estimation.
27A DID strategy would suggest the pre-treatment trends of these two groups are not paralleled.
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have an overall improvement in all students’ test scores.
Appendix Figure A10 assesses the role of teachers by presenting the evidence on
teachers’ experience levels and absences. Panels A and B show no discontinuity for
teachers’ average experience levels in the year when the policy was implemented;
Panels C and D suggest a small increase in teachers’ absences.28 The gray dashed
lines suggest that the inference test does not support any of these effects, although the
gray lines’ messiness weakens the test. Appendix Figure A11 uses the DID strategy to
complement the analysis on teachers, and it shows no effects either.29 These results
suggest that being assigned to more experienced teachers or having teachers with
fewer absences cannot explain the (lack of) effects of the retention policy.
In conclusion, the retention policy alone did not significantly improve students’
academic achievement overall, apart from some evidence suggesting a positive effect
on math test scores and English test scores (statistically insignificant) concentrated
among at-risk students. Examining teachers’ characteristics shows no effects. Placebo
tests using grades not subject to the policy show no effects either.
1.5 The Accountability Scheme Alone
This section focuses on grades not subject to the retention policy and uses a DID
strategy to estimate the effects of the accountability scheme in isolation on lowest-
28Schools may have assigned teachers based on a cutoff of three years’ experience, since the
probationary period for a nontenured teacher in NYC was three years, and Rivkin, Hanushek, and
Kain (2005) showed that teacher effectiveness improves the most in the first three years. Using an
indicator of three or more years of experience also shows no effects.
29Appendix Table A1 shows that all coefficients are small and statistically insignificant, consistent




The identification strategy examines students in grade levels not subject to the re-
tention policy to estimate the effects of the accountability scheme on the school-wide
lowest-third students in isolation. The analysis adopts a DID strategy: The treatment
group is lowest-third students, and the control group is top-two-thirds students. Be-
cause the retention policy only applied to general education students and the policy
interaction will focus on these students, the following analysis separately examines
general education students and special education/ELL students.30
The empirical specification follows a DID model with grade-year fixed effects and
a control function:
Aist = β0 + φFgr(Ait′) + γ
′Xit + θgt + β1Lowist′ + β2Lowist′ ∗ Actit + ϵist (1.2)
where Fgr(Ait′) includes grade-specific cubic polynomials of prior test scores in math
and English, absences, and suspensions, which interact with an indicator of repeating
a grade; θgt represents year-grade fixed effects; Xit is a vector of student characteris-
tics; Lowist′ indicates the status of being a school-wide lowest-third student in subject
s and year t; and Lowist′∗Actit is an interaction term between Lowist′ and an indicator
of the post-accountability years, Actit. β2 estimates the effect of the accountability
30The latter students could potentially earn extra credit for schools in the accountability scheme,
and thus might have received additional assistance.
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scheme on lowest-third students. Standard errors are clustered at the school-year
level.
The control function deals with a concern that arises from the fact that the dis-
tribution of test scores changed over time and the change differed across grades. Ap-
pendix Figure A12 shows that the average prior test scores for each grade (displayed
separately for lowest-third and top-two-thirds students) increased in a non-monotonic
manner.31 This pattern may have induced different mean reversion patterns during
the same period, which would confound the estimation of the effect when directly
comparing lowest-third students with other students.
Since such trends are not monotonic, including a linear time trend may not address
the issue. Moreover, mean reversion depends on not only the average of prior test
scores but also the distribution of prior test scores. Appendix Figure A13 presents
the relationships between current and prior outcomes for each grade for years prior
to the implementation of either policy. Clearly, these relationships are non-linear and
vary across grades, especially for math test scores.
Including grade-specific cubic polynomials of lagged outcomes may address this
issue by controlling for differences in the distribution of prior test scores across grades
and years. Allowing the coefficients to vary by repeating a grade deals with the issue
that the percentage of retained students changed during this period. The coefficients
might change over years due to other concurrent shocks. Examining the pre-treatment
trend may check this issue, and a flat pre-trend alleviates such a concern.
31The non-monotonicity is partially due to the policies implemented on certain subgroups of
students in different years and grades, such as the retention policy.
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The graphical analysis also shows the distributional effects of the policy, plotting
the means of residuals against students’ prior ranks in each subject. The residuals
are obtained by regressing the outcomes according to the following specification:
Ait = β0 + φFgr(Ait′) + γ
′Xit + θgt + ϵit︸︷︷︸
A˜it
(1.3)
in which Fgr(Ait′) is the control function, Xit is a vector of demographic characteris-
tics, and θgt contains grade-year fixed effects. Residuals A˜i,t are obtained for graphical
analysis.
Graphical Evidence
Figure 1.4 presents an event-study version of Equation 1.2, which plots the coeffi-
cient β2 and its 95% confidence interval for each year, focusing on general education
students. The left panels (A, C, and E) examine math-lowest-third students. Panel
A shows a flat pre-treatment trend and a small drop in math test scores in the year
when the accountability scheme was implemented. Panel C shows that students’ ab-
sences are flat prior to the policy except for a small jump right before the policy was
enacted; there is another jump in the year when the policy was implemented; Stu-
dents’ suspension rates (Panel E) rise steadily before the policy and seem to increase
slightly when the policy was implemented.32 Panels B, D, and F present the results
for English-lowest-third students. There is an upward trend in the pre-treatment
32The change in 2005 might reflect the effect of adopting the state tests/accountability. However,
the main conclusion seems robust to accounting for this change.
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period but no clear jump in the year of the policy.
Appendix Figure A14 presents the distributional effects and supports Figure 1.4.
Prior ranks are divided into 33 quantiles at the subject-grade-school level. There are
three lines in each panel: The lighter dashed line plots the means of the residuals in
the years 2003 and 2004, the darker one plots the years 2005 and 2006, and triangles
represent the post-accountability era. The left panels (A, C, and E) use prior math
ranks as the x-axis and show that math-lowest-third students are driving the effects.
The right panels (B, D, and F) use prior English ranks as the x-axis and show overall
negligible effects on English-lowest-third students.
The lowest-third students do not seem to have received different teachers. Ap-
pendix Figure A15 uses the same specification and shows no discernible discontinuity
for teachers’ experience levels and absences in the year of the accountability scheme.
Appendix Figure A16 presents the results for special education/ELL students.
Because of the smaller sample size, the overall movement is more jumpy, and the
confidence intervals are larger than in Figure 1.4. However, it appears that the
accountability scheme induced little improvement in these lowest-third students’ test
scores, absences, and suspension rates.
Regression Results
Table 1.2 presents the point estimates for general education students. The results are
generated by Equation 1.2, with a time trend for lowest-third students to accommo-
date the pre-treatment trend. Consistent with the graphical evidence, Panel A shows
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that math-lowest-third students experienced a decline of 0.075 points in math test
scores (10% of a standard deviation); absences increased by 0.23 days (marginally sig-
nificant), and suspension rates increased by 0.004 percentage points (insignificant).
Panel B shows that English-lowest-third students experienced a negligible change
in their English test scores (0.031 points, or 4% of a standard deviation), absences
(0.048 days), and suspension rates (-0.27 percentage points). The effects on teachers’
experience levels and absences (Appendix Table A2) are all small and statistically
insignificant.33
A potential concern is that adopting the state tests may have changed the distri-
bution of students across achievement levels and confounded the effects. Appendix
Figure A17 plots the percentage of free lunch recipients (a proxy for socioeconomic
status) across students’ ranks in 2005 and 2006 (the year when the state tests were
adopted) and shows no evidence of such a change.
In summation, the accountability scheme alone did not substantially improve
English-lowest-third students’ academic achievements and may have slightly harmed
(in a relative sense) math-lowest-third students’ academic achievements. Further,
there is no evidence that more experienced or less absent teachers were assigned to
lowest-third students.
33Replacing teachers’ experience levels with an indicator of having three or more years of expe-
rience also shows no effects.
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1.6 Policy Interaction
This section uses a triple-difference model to estimate the interactive effects of the
retention policy and the accountability scheme on lowest-third students.
Identification Strategy
The identification strategy focuses on students subject to the retention policy and
uses a triple-difference model to estimate the interactive effects of the two policies
on school-wide lowest-third students. The model essentially subtracts the sum of the
individual effects of the retention policy and the accountability scheme from their
combined effects on lowest-third students. The empirical specification is as follows:
Aist = β0 + φFgr(Ait′) + γ
′Xit + θgt + β1Lowist′ + β2Lowist′ ∗G5it
+ β3Lowist′ ∗RetPolit + β4Lowist′ ∗ Actit + β5Lowist′ ∗RetPolit ∗ Actit + ϵist (1.4)
in which Lowist′ indicates being a school-wide lowest-third student in subject s;
Lowist′ ∗RetPoligt, Lowist′ ∗Actit, and Lowist′ ∗G5it stand for three interactive terms
between Lowist′ and indicators of the accountability scheme, the retention policy, and
being in 5th grade, respectively; Lowist′ ∗ RetPoligt ∗ Actit indicates the triple inter-
action between lowest-third students, the accountability scheme, and the retention
policy. β5 provides the interactive effect between these two policies. Standard errors
are clustered at the school-year level.
Since the estimation compares students across grade levels, a potential concern is
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that the results might be confounded by the use of different tests. Since the lowest-
third element also applies to students who are exempt from the retention policy, the
analysis applies the same specification to these students as a placebo test.
Graphical Evidence
Figure 1.5 presents the graphical evidence on the interactive effects by plotting the
effect of being a lowest-third student in 5th grade in each year. There are three
periods: Years 2003 and 2004 capture the pre-policy differences; years 2005 and 2006
show the effects of the retention policy on lowest-third students; years 2007, 2008,
and 2009 reflect the interactive effect of the two policies.
The left panels (A, C, and E) present the evidence on math-lowest-third stu-
dents.It is evident that the retention policy did not differentially affect math-lowest-
third students, possibly because the retention policy concerns absolute test scores
while lowest-third students are defined by their relative test scores. When the ac-
countability scheme was implemented two years later, there is a clear and substantial
jump in math test scores and a drop in students’ absences and suspension rates.34
Panels B, D, and F present the results for English-lowest-third students and show
overall negligible effects, except for a modest increase in English test scores. The
small effect in English is consistent with the overall insignificant effects of each policy
in isolation on English test scores.
Figure 1.6 presents the placebo test, using students exempt from the retention
34The jump in 2006 might reflect the impact of the state test/accountability, but the magnitude
looks fairly small.
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policy. Because of the smaller sample size, the overall patterns are jumpier and
noisier. Panels A, C, and E present the results for math-lowest-third exempt students
and show no evidence of any effects in the year when the accountability scheme was
implemented. Panels B, D, and F also show little improvement among English-
lowest-third exempt students, with some suggestive evidence of increased suspension
rates.35 There seems to be an upward trend after the policy was implemented, which
is perhaps driven by the compositional change depicted in Appendix Figure A4 (as
discussed in the data section).
Appendix Figure A18 presents the distributional effects and supports the main
results. The x-axis is a student’s prior rank in each subject, and each point reflects
the difference between students with a particular prior rank in 5th grade and those
with the same prior rank in the control grades. Years in Figure 1.5 are divided into
three periods: years prior to both policies, years with only the retention policy, and
years with both policies.
The left panels (A, C, and E) present the effects on math-lowest-third students.
Panel A shows little change in math test scores when the retention policy took effect
and a substantial improvement in math test scores for all lowest-third students when
both policies were in effect.36 Panels C and E exhibit a relatively uniform decline
in math-lowest-third students’ absences and suspension rates with both policies in
place. The right panels (B, D, and F) display the results for English-lowest-third
35The increase in suspension rates is driven by both a sharp increase in 5th grade and a drop in
6th grade, but the exact cause is unclear.
36This figure also suggests that the median score component in the accountability scheme does
not seem to have affected median students’ test scores.
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students. There is an improvement in English test scores but negligible changes on
absences and suspension rates when both policies were in effect.
The distributional effects suggest a reallocation of school effort from higher-
achieving students to lowest-third students in math but not in English. Because
students are compared with one another, each outcome is zero-sum in a given year,
and additional gains among all students are absent from this figure. If lowest-third
students received additional school effort while the others received a similar amount
of effort after the accountability scheme, the negative effects on higher-achieving stu-
dents should be flat as opposed to oblique. There is a clear downward-sloping curve
in the figure for higher achievers in math and a uniform change for those in English.
This difference might be because the input for learning math is more incompatible
across student achievement levels than the input for learning English, and accommo-
dating lower-achieving math students might necessarily harm high achievers in the
class.37
However, Appendix Figure A19 shows that teacher experience levels and absences
do not seem to explain such a reallocation. All panels show little evidence of change
when the accountability scheme was implemented.
Regression Results
Table 1.3 presents the point estimates based on Equation 1.4 for students subject
to the retention policy. Panel A shows that math-lowest-third students experienced
37Some evidence supports such an explanation: Data show that within-class variance in math
(0.5) is larger than that in English (0.35).
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an improvement of 0.26 points in math test scores (34% of a standard deviation), a
reduction of 0.5 days in absences, and a decline of 0.68% in suspension rates, all of
which are statistically significant at the .1% level. Panel B presents the results for
English-lowest-third students: English test scores increased by 0.053 points (8% of a
standard deviation), absences declined by 0.2 days, and suspension rates decreased
by 0.45 percentage points. The latter two estimates are marginally significant.3839
Appendix Table A3 presents the results for students exempt from the retention
policy and restricts the estimation to the years between 2003 and 2007 to account for
the compositional change in 2008. The point estimates show no significant impact of
the policy interaction.
Appendix Table A4 shows small and statistically insignificant effects on all out-
comes, which are consistent with the graphical evidence.40 Since teachers are possibly
the most important resource that schools may allocate across classes to improve stu-
dents’ test scores, these results suggest that the reallocation of school effort might
be within rather than across classes. Data also show little evidence that lowest-third
students were assigned to smaller classes or were more likely to be clustered with
other lowest-third students. This evidence also supports the argument in favor of
within-class reallocation of effort, which is most probably from teachers.
38Clustering the errors at the school level has a negligible effect on the standard errors; controlling
for prior exempt/nonexempt status has a negligible effect on the point estimates
39I also explore the possibility that schools receiving D and F may have exerted more effort and
induced a larger complementary effect. The point estimates support this possibility but they are
not statistically significant.
40Replacing the dependent variable with an indicator of being assigned to teachers with three or
more years of experience produces similar results.
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Robustness and Placebo Tests
This section presents additional evidence that the interactive effects of the retention
policy and the accountability scheme are unlikely to be driven by other confounding
factors.
The first exercise performs a robustness check to deal with potential confound-
ing factors due to other elements in the accountability scheme. This concern is
likely small, since lowest-third students cover a variety of student characteristics and
achievement levels. Such elements include citywide lowest-third students, students in
certain ethnic groups, and the percentage of students achieving proficiency levels 3
and 4 on the standardized tests. The check formally tests these elements by including
year-specific covariates of being a citywide lowest-third student, categorical dummies
of ethnicity groups, and having prior test scores between 2.5 and 3.5.41 Appendix
Table A5 shows the point estimates, which are quite similar to the main results.
The second exercise conducts a placebo test focusing on schools where most stu-
dents had no risks of failing the test. Since the passing threshold in the retention
policy was in absolute terms and the lowest-third element in the accountability scheme
concerns low-achieving students in relative terms, a placebo test may examine those
who are not at risk of being retained under the retention policy but are defined as
lowest-third students in their schools. The estimation follows the same specification
as the main regression but focuses on schools with average test scores above the 75th
percentile among all schools.42 Appendix Table A6 presents the point estimates and
41These students have a higher marginal probability of reaching proficiency level 3.
42Because there are students at-risk of failing the test even in the very high achieving schools,
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shows no effects on all outcomes.43
A Possible Mechanism
The main results suggest that the complementary effects of the two policies may be
due to complementarity of teacher and student effort. Formally connecting the policy
interaction and the complementarity in the production function is more challenging.
The appendix presents a conceptual framework that illustrates this connection under
certain assumptions. The following paragraphs describe a potential mechanism for
the results for math-lowest-third students in the empirical analysis.
The accountability scheme in NYC aimed at improving the test scores of students
across achievement levels, with an additional emphasis on students scoring in the
lowest third. As a result, teachers needed to perform multiple tasks, from tailoring
the coursework toward skills covered in the standardized tests to identifying and
working on “bubble students” whose test scores were most likely to be improved by
teachers’ efforts. The question is then which students were seen as “bubble students”
when the accountability scheme took effect.
When the retention policy was in effect, students’ incentives to improve test scores
were low, especially among low-achieving students, and these barely motivated stu-
dents might have disliked and resisted the test-preparation atmosphere at the school.
Although the accountability scheme assigned greater weight to lowest-third students,
this placebo test is somewhat impure but still can provide important evidence of the interactive
effects in schools which had much fewer at-risk students.
43Separately estimating the effect on general education and exempt students generated positive
effects of similar magnitudes.
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these students might not have been seen as “bubble students” if teachers found it
difficult to teach them. As a result, teachers may have shifted their focus to other
students.
However, the presence of the retention policy increased lowest-third students’
incentives to improve their test scores, and they may have paid more attention in
class. As a result, these students became “bubble students,” and therefore the lowest-
third element in the accountability scheme incentivized teachers to shift effort toward
them, which complemented student effort.
1.7 Conclusion
The collaborative nature of school instruction gives rise to the possibility of using
incentive alignment to realize organizational complementarities in human capital pro-
duction. This paper investigates this possibility by examining the interaction between
a grade retention policy (a student-side incentive) and an accountability scheme (a
school-side incentive) in NYC. Although grade retention and accountability policies
have each been implemented in many settings and evaluated in many studies, the
current study is the first to evaluate their interactive effects.
The empirical analysis shows that the retention policy alone improved at-risk
students’ math scores modestly (by 10% of a standard deviation) but not their En-
glish scores, absences, or suspensions. The accountability scheme aimed at increasing
lowest-third students’ test scores, but it alone did not greatly improve these stu-
dents’ test scores relative to top-two-thirds students: English-lowest-third students
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comparatively experienced 4% of a standard deviation increase in English test scores,
math-lowest-third experienced 10% of a standard deviation decrease in math test
scores, and both experienced little effect on absences or suspensions.
Combining the retention policy and the accountability scheme showed substantial
complementarity among lowest-third students in the grade subject to the retention
policy, improving math-lowest-third students’ math scores by 33% of a standard
deviation and English-lowest-third students’ English scores by 10% of a standard
deviation. Math-lowest-third students also experienced a decline in absences and
suspension rates. Robustness checks support the results for math but not for En-
glish.
Evidence suggests that the complementary effects are likely driven by comple-
mentarity of student and teacher effort rather than by more experienced teachers,
smaller class sizes, or assignment of lowest-third students to the same class. These
results suggest that there are additional benefits obtained by aligning teacher and
student incentives, and that cooperation between teachers and students is essential
in education production.
The complementarity of these two incentive-based policies in education provides
further evidence that incentive alignment is an important source of organizational
complementarities and suggests that school/teacher effort and student effort may
be complements in human capital production. Such complementarities provide an
explanation of why improving performance at low-achieving schools is very difficult:
The marginal benefit of one specific practice is small without other complementary
organizational practices.
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The substantial interaction between the two policies in the current study under-
scores the importance of considering incentive policies in combination with each other.
Policy design is more efficient when it involves a joint consideration of all possible
interventions and their combined impact — and particularly when it takes into ac-
count agents’ potential behavioral responses (Malamud, Pop-Eleches, and Urquiola,
2016; Todd and Wolpin, 2003). The prevalence of various incentive programs and
the interactive nature of production in education and other areas makes this consid-
eration highly relevant and important. The prevalence of various incentive programs
and the interactive nature of production in education and other areas makes policies’
interactive effects an important concern for policy-makers.
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1.8 Figures





















































Notes: Both panels are restricted to the years prior to the accountability scheme (prior to 2007).
Each point represents the probability of being retained at each value of the index. The index is
defined as the difference between a student’s spring test score and the cutoff in each subject.
Students on the left of the gray vertical line failed the test. Pre-Ret combines the grades/years not
subject to the retention policy, and Post-Ret combines the grades/years subject to the retention
policy.
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Grade 5 Grade 4 and 6 (Combined)
Notes: Both panels focus on students subject to the retention policy. Each point restricts the
observations to the students in Figure 1.1 and represents the probability of retention conditional
on failing the test in each subject-grade-year cell — that is,
Prob(Retention|Fail)− Prob(Retention|Pass). Blue triangles present the probability of retention
for 5th grade; Gray squares present the probability of retention for 4th and 6th grades. To the
right of the black line are years after the retention policy was implemented.
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Notes: All panels are based on data from 2002 to 2006 and use the grade subject to the retention
policy. The red line plots the difference between the treatment group and the synthetic control
group in each year; the gray lines plot the difference between each member in the donor pool and
its synthetic control group in each year. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are test scores
in math and English; the dependent variables in Panels C and D are the number of days absent
from school and an indicator of ever being suspended from school. To the right of the black line
are years after the retention policy was implemented.
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2003 2005 2007 2009
Year
Notes: All panels are based on data from 2003 to 2009 and focus on general education students in
4th and 6th grades. This figure plots coefficients β2 for each year from an event-study version of
Equation 1.2. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are test scores in each subject; the
dependent variables in Panels C and D are days absent from school; the dependent variables in
Panels E and F are probability of suspension. To the right of the black line are years after the
accountability scheme was implemented.
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2003 2005 2007 2009
Year
Notes: All panels use data from 2003 to 2009, focus on students subject to the retention policy, and
plot a time series of DID estimates that use the residuals generated from regression 1.3 to measure
the effects of being a lowest-third student in the high-stakes grade in terms of the retention policy.
The left panels focus on lowest-third students in math, and the right panels examine lowest-third
students in English. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are test scores in math and
English; the dependent variable in Panels C and D is the number of days absent from school; the
dependent variable in Panels E and F is an indicator of ever being suspended from school. To the
right of the black line are years after the accountability scheme was implemented.
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2003 2005 2007 2009
Year
Notes: All panels use data from 2003 to 2009, focus on students exempt from the retention policy,
and plot a time series of DID estimates that use the residuals generated from regression 1.3 to
measure the effect of being a lowest-third student in the high-stakes grade in terms of the retention
policy. The left panels focus on lowest-third students in math, and the right panels examine
lowest-third students in English. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are test scores in
math and English; the dependent variable in Panels C and D is the number of days absent from
school; the dependent variable in Panels E and F is an indicator of ever being suspended from
school. To the right of the black line are years after the accountability scheme was implemented.
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1.9 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Full Sample Lowest-Third Top-Two-Thirds
Retention 0.02 0.04 0
Free Lunch 0.83 0.85 0.81
Rescaled Math 3.20 (0.76) 2.66 3.52
Rescaled English 3.09 (0.64) 2.61 3.37
Absences 11.44 (10.73) 13.37 10.32
Suspension 0.02 0.03 0.02
Teacher Experience 6.65 6.22 6.90
Teacher Absences 8.15 8.21 8.11
Observations 1,703,423 629,611 1,073,812
Notes: Table shows summary statistics on the eligible students for the whole sample, school-wide
lowest-third students in either subject, and school-wide top-two-thirds students in both subjects.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 1.2: Effects of the Accountability Scheme
Test Scores Absences Suspension
Panel A: Math-lowest-third
Low*Act -0.075∗∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.00041
(0.0068) (0.098) (0.0022)
Panel B: English-lowest-third
Low*Act 0.031∗∗∗ 0.048 -0.0027
(0.0056) (0.094) (0.0022)
Observations 764,941 764,941 764,941
Notes: All regressions restrict observations to grades not subject to the retention policy, implement
specification 1.2, and display the coefficient of Lowist′ ∗Actit, the interaction term. In Panels A
and B, the interaction term is a dummy for the interaction of being in the post-accountability era
and being a lowest-third student in math and English, respectively. Standard errors are clustered
at school-year level in parentheses. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Table 1.3: Interactive Effects on Students
Test Scores Absences Suspension
Panel A: Math-lowest-third
Low*Ret*Act 0.26∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ -0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.086) (0.0018)
Panel B: English-lowest-third
Low*Ret*Act 0.053∗∗∗ -0.20∗ -0.0045∗
(0.0050) (0.082) (0.0018)
Observations 1,155,107 1,155,107 1,155,107
Notes: All regressions implement specification 1.4. The coefficient of the triple-interaction term
Lowist′ ∗Actit ∗RetPoligt is displayed. The triple-interaction term is a dummy for the triple
interaction of being a lowest-third student in math or English, being in the post-accountability era,
and being subject to the retention policy. Standard errors are clustered at school-year level in
parentheses.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Chapter 2
Does Repeating a Grade Make Students (and Parents) Happier?
Regression Discontinuity Evidence from New York City
(with Jonah Rockoff)
2.1 Introduction
Schools across the globe routinely organize students by grade levels, where individuals
of a similar age are taught together. Children typically enter school with members of
their cohort, as determined by a date-of-birth cutoff, and advance one grade level per
year. Undoubtedly, this practice arises from the notion that some form of tracking, i.e.
grouping together students with relatively similar levels of knowledge and maturity,
is the most efficient way to provide instruction. However, the primary use of age to
determine grade levels inevitably leads to the following problem: what should public
school systems do when a student’s level of knowledge or preparation is well below
that of his/her age group?1
1Of course, public school systems may also have to deal with students whose knowledge or
preparation far exceeds that of their age cohort. To the best of our knowledge, there is little, if
any, research in economics on promoting students ahead of their cohort. Some research on “Gifted
and Talented” programs finds that the marginal students admitted to the program did not see
improvements in achievement (Bui, Craig, and Imberman (2014)). The practice of “redshirting,”
i.e., holding children out of school for an additional year before they start kindergarten (see Deming
and Dynarski (2008)), is also similar in many ways to retention, but is beyond the scope of this
paper. Similarly, we do not address the larger literature on the effects of tracking students by age
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One policy used to address this problem is retention, whereby a student repeats
the same grade level with the following (younger) cohort of students, and is expected
to remain with this younger cohort for the remaining years of public instruction.
The use of grade retention is common in the U.S., where Eide and Showalter (2001)
estimate that 2 percent of all students in public schools are retained every year.
Retention is typically part of a broader set of interventions, such as summer school
or course remediation, which are designed to help students improve when they lag
behind their grade level. Retention decisions can be based on various measures of
academic performance, and the use of high-stakes tests to determine grade retention
has grown in the U.S. since the adoption of test-based accountability programs in the
last two decades.
Grade retention is highly controversial, with critics arguing that it imposes nega-
tive academic and psychological effects on low performing students (Anderson, Whip-
ple, and Jimerson (2005)) and advocates contending that the policy can be academ-
ically helpful and psychologically encouraging (Wu, West, and Hughes (2010)).2 Ad-
dressing this controversy with empirical research is also difficult, as it necessitates
understanding the likely counterfactual experience of retained students who almost
certainly are experiencing severe difficulties in school. For this reason, a number of re-
searchers have turned to the use of regression discontinuity, comparing the outcomes
of students who just fail or just pass high-stakes academic assessments that determine
or ability, e.g., Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011).
2Note that if retention is undesirable for students (or parents), such policies may also have
positive incentive effects on students who are in danger of failing, and thus exert greater effort to
pass. See Koppensteiner (2014) for evidence of incentive effects from a change in retention policy in
Brazil. Our approach does not capture these broader effects of retention.
46
grade retention (e.g., Jacob and Lefgren (2004b, 2009), Manacorda (2012), Mariano
and Martorell (2013), Ozek (2015), and Schwerdt, West, and Winters (2015)). These
studies conclude that retention leads to increased academic achievement in the short-
run, particularly for students held back in elementary school, but also find evidence
of short-run increases in disciplinary incidents and long-run decreases in educational
attainment, particularly for students held back at later grade levels.3
An additional hurdle in evaluating the effects of grade retention is that many
outcomes are not easily comparable between retained and promoted students. For
instance, students who are retained typically take different exams than those who
are promoted, making it difficult to compare their relative academic performance.4
Examinations of longer-run outcomes (e.g., school completion or wages) avoid this
type of measurement problem, but face other issues related to interpretation.5
3Other studies of retention use different empirical approaches for identification and also paint
a mixed picture. For example, Eide and Showalter (2001) use age as an instrument for retention
and find positive effects on wages, and Wu, West, and Hughes (2010) find retention to be associated
with lower teacher-rated hyperactivity, peer-rated sadness, and higher academic competence based
on propensity score matching. In contrast, Garcia-Pereza, Hidalgo-Hidalgoa, and Robles-Zurita
(2014), in a study based on quarter of birth as an instrument, present evidence that retained students
in Spain score lower on PISA examinations.
4Researchers have addressed this measurement problem with methods based on somewhat strong
econometric or psychometric assumptions on the vertical scaling of scores for tests developed for
different grade levels which cover different material (Mariano and Martorell (2013) and Schwerdt,
West, and Winters (2015)). Nevertheless, in a deeper sense, measuring the effect of retention on
short-run academic performance is always a complicated question when achievement measures are
not curriculum-free. To illustrate, suppose some fraction of a school’s 7th graders were randomly
assigned to repeat 7th grade math, with the remaining promoted to 8th grade math, and all of these
students take the exact same math test the following year. If that math test is based purely on the
8th grade curricula, it would not be surprising if the retained students did worse (since they have
never seen this material), just as it would not be surprising if the retained students did better if
the test was based purely on the material taught in 7th grade (which they have seen twice). More
generally, the conclusions from any test will depend on the relationship of the tested material to the
material that students have been taught. Without a curriculum-free manner of assessing academic
knowledge, the exercise is somewhat meaningless.
5For example, suppose that students (randomly) retained had higher years of schooling but lower
grades completed than those who were (randomly) promoted. Whether this represents a positive
or negative net effect on human capital is unclear. Similarly, if one found that students (randomly)
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In this paper, we examine the impact of retention in New York City public schools.
Our contribution to the retention literature stems from our use of an unusual source
of data: annual surveys of students (in grades 6 through 12) and parents (of students
in all grades), which are administered late in the school year (but prior to retention
decisions) and include many questions about the quality of students’ educational
experience. Since the survey questions are the same regardless of a student’s grade
level, we avoid the measurement problems associated with short-term outcomes like
test scores. Because our data contain four waves of surveys, we can also address
a number of issues related to interpretation, such as the separation of grade effects
from retention effects or whether short run effects of retention fade out quickly over
time.6 As in previous studies, we rely on a discontinuity in the relationship between
the probability of retention and scores on mathematics and English Language Arts
(ELA) exams taken by students in grades three through eight. Failing these exams
was always a factor in the determination of retention in New York City, but it became
a much stronger determinant of retention after reforms which were phased in between
2004 and 2008.
We find robust evidence that overall parental satisfaction with school quality rises
retained had slightly lower earnings as those that were (randomly) promoted early in their work
careers, does this mean retention (which entails greater educational costs) is not a cost-effective
policy? If returns to experience and job-tenure are concave (e.g., Topel 1991), then the early-career
and lifetime earnings gaps may have opposite signs, given that promoted students, who finished
school a year earlier, are likely to have one more year of early career labor market experience.
6Because we have many cohorts and multiple waves of surveys, we can separate grade and
year effects from effects of retention. One issue of interpretation we cannot resolve is the fact that
retention policies can be bundled with other services, such as attending summer school or receiving
more attention from teachers if they are retained. Although we discuss the effects we document as
stemming from retention, it is possible that repeating grades without offering additional services
would lead to different outcomes.
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significantly in the three years after students are retained. We do not see similar im-
pacts for students’ overall satisfaction with school quality, but we do find significant
positive effects on students’ feelings of personal safety in school in the years following
retention. We also examine more conventional outcomes such as test scores, student
absences, student suspension, and receiving special education. As in prior research,
we find retention has large positive effects on students’ test scores relative to their
(younger) same-grade peers. We see little impacts on student absences and student
suspension but we discern a positive effect on the likelihood of receiving special edu-
cation. Overall, our results indicate that grade retention has positive impacts on the
educational experience of students who comply with the test-based policies in place
in New York City, as indicated by their parents’ opinions. Whether parental opinion
is a good barometer of educational quality is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet we
would note that society relies on parents to make myriad decisions related to their
children’s education, and these views are therefore important to examine.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data
and retention policies in New York City. Section 3 provides a brief overview of our
identification strategy. Section 4 presents our main findings, and Section 5 presents
an extension of our analysis aimed at identifying effects of retention away from the
cutoff. Section 6 concludes.
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2.2 Data Description and Policy Background
We link two databases in order to conduct our analyses. The first is administrative
records from the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) with basic
information of all third to eighth graders who were enrolled in NYC public schools.
The NYCDOE is the largest district in the nation, with roughly 80,000 students per
grade. These data include each student’s enrollment in a school and grade level,
mathematics and ELA test scores, gender, ethnicity, English language learner status,
special education status, free lunch status, total absences, and total suspensions. We
use students’ grade information between adjacent years to determine retention. We
drop a small number of observations with vary rare test scores (i.e., 25 students or
less), as these likely come from make-up tests that use a different scale than the
normally scheduled exam. We normalize test scores by grade and year to have mean
zero and standard deviation one. The standard deviation of scores in New York City
on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) is comparable with the
standard deviation nationwide.
The second database includes responses of parents and students to survey ques-
tions collected by the NYCDOE between 2007 and 2010.7 Starting in the spring
of 2007, the NYCDOE has distributed annual surveys to all students from grade 6
to 12 and all parents in public schools. Survey results count for 10-15 percent of a
school’s score in its annual Progress Report, the main school accountability tool used
by NYCDOE (see Rockoff and Turner 2010 for details). The surveys have roughly 20
7Copies of these surveys, as well as more recent versions, can be found at http://schools.nyc.
gov/Accountability/tools/survey/default.htm
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questions, are translated into nine languages and, of great importance for our study,
ask the same questions of all parents and students regardless of grade level.8 In our
sample around 80 percent of students and 50 percent of parents responded. Survey
questions differed slightly between years but the vast majority of questions remained
the same throughout and response rates were relatively high compared to other school
surveys (Nathanson, McCormick, and Kemple, 2013).
In 2003, the new NYCDOE administration under Mayor Michael Bloomberg be-
gan work to end the practice of “social promotion,” where promotion was by default
and retention was a rare occurrence, and replace it with a stricter test-based reten-
tion policy. This major policy shift, which received a lot of media attention (e.g.,
Campanile, 2004; Dobbs, 2004; Gootman, 2004; Herszenhorn, 2004) and was fairly
controversial, meant that students in grades 3 through 8, with the important excep-
tions of English language learners and special education students, could be prevented
from moving to the next grade if they failed to meet a cutoff score on either the
mathematics or ELA tests. Importantly, this more intensive retention policy regime
was phased in across grade levels: third grade starting in 2004, fifth grade starting
in 2005, and seventh grade starting in 2006.9
Figure 2.1 describes the chronological order of testing, survey administration, and
8Two exceptions are that high school students are asked about college/career counseling and
parents of high school students are asked about the presence of security staff at the school.
9Eighth grade was also subject to the new policy starting in 2009, but we do not examine these
tests due to a data limitation. Our administrative records on student enrollment end in grade eight,
we cannot observe promoted 8th graders who do not respond to surveys in 9th grade, whereas we
observe all retained 8th graders regardless of survey response. We therefore do not examine retention
in 8th grade in our main tables, although our results are robust to their inclusion (see Appendix
Tables A7, A8, and A9).
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the steps in the process leading to retention decisions. Tests and survey administra-
tion are completed by April, but test results are not typically reported until close
to the end of the school year. If a student fails either test, the school principal and
teachers review the student’s academic portfolio and decide whether to promote the
student or require the student to attend summer school. At the end of summer school,
students are given another opportunity to pass the tests and, after another review,
final retention/promotion decisions are made. We do not have any information on
portfolio review, summer school, or make-up testing.
We focus on students tested in school years 2004-2005 through 2007-2008, as we
can measure grade retention and link subsequent survey responses for these students.
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.1 for our sample, which excludes observa-
tions when students would not have been subject to the test-based retention policy
due to receipt of special education services or classification as an English Language
Learner (ELL). Before focusing on the set of students scoring close to the cutoffs,
we present some descriptive statistics on the broader sample (Table 2.1 Column 1).
This sample’s average test scores are around 0.2 standard deviations higher than the
district mean due to our dropping ELL and special education students exempt from
test-based retention policies. Six percent of the students in the sample failed their
English exam, eight percent failed their math exam, two percent were retained the
year after taking the test, and 5.7% of the student sample was retained at least once.10
10This is similar to the retention rate of 5.1% we calculate for public school students (who were
not receiving special education or ELL services) in the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS-
K). The ECLS-K follows a nationally representative cohort of students that (absent retention) would
reach third grade in the fall of 2001, just a few years prior to the cohorts examined in our NYC
sample.
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Among our sample of students subject to the retention policy in a particular year,
5.5% are later exempt due to a future change in their ELL or special education status;
in order to prevent potential bias due to endogenous selection into these categories,
we examine outcomes in future years regardless of this future classification. Last, but
not least, Table 2.1 shows that the vast majority of students in our NYC sample are
poor, as indicated by receipt of free or reduced price lunch (86 percent), that these
students are absent an average of 12 days during the year, and that three percent
were suspended from school for misbehavior at least once during the year.
Our regression discontinuity design is based on student-year observations with
English and/or math test scores close to the cutoff. We show summary statistics
separately for students whose (lowest) score is just below the cutoff (Column 2) from
those whose scores are exactly at or just above the cutoff (Column 3).11 On average,
13 percent of students scoring just below a cutoff are retained, compared with around
0.01% for students scoring just above the cutoff. Thus, failing an exam seems to be a
necessary, but clearly not sufficient, condition for retention. Compared to the entire
sample, it is not surprising that students scoring near the cutoff are far more likely to
be from poor households, from disadvantaged minority groups, have higher absences
from school, and are more likely to have been suspended. There are also much smaller
but still statistically significant differences in observables between those who score just
above versus those who score just below the cutoff. Students just above the cutoff are
less likely to receive free/reduced lunch (93% vs. 95%), had fewer absences (14.7 vs.
11This sample includes students with test scores within five scores of the cutoff, for a total of
eleven possible scores on each test administration, which is the window we use for our main results.
We examine robustness of our results to inclusion/exclusion of more scores in Section 4.4.
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17) and were less likely to be suspended from school (4.0% vs. 5.4%). In Columns 4
and 5 of Table 2.1, we further split the students scoring just below a cutoff by whether
or not they were actually retained. Again, there are small but significant differences,
showing that retained students are clearly not a random subset among the students
who barely fail these exams. Those who are eventually promoted have roughly 0.40
standard deviations higher average test scores, fewer absences (16 vs. 20), lower
suspension rates (5.0% vs 7.0%), and are slightly less likely to receive free/reduced
lunch (94% vs. 96%).
We performed factor analyses of responses on the parent and student surveys to
generate a small number of outcome variables. The results of this analysis (available
upon request) showed three underlying factors for students: overall satisfaction, sense
of personal safety, and perception of the school environment. For parents, there were
just two factors: overall satisfaction and perception of school safety.12 Appendix
A lists the question numbers (taken from the 2008 survey) for the items used to
construct each of these variables. We code survey variable values to range from 0
to 100 for easier interpretation, where 0 means that the least favorable answers were
always selected and 100 percent means that the most favorable answers were always
selected.13
12Survey questions were originally designed to measure four dimensions of school quality for both
parents and students: Academic Expectation, Communication, Engagement, and Safety & Respect.
However, Rockoff and Speroni (2008) analyzes the reliability, consistency, and validity of the surveys
and finds, as we do here, that responses do not line up along these four dimensions.
13This rescaling also deal with questions that do not have the same number of choices. For
example, if a question had five possible answers, we gave 0 points for the least favorable, followed
by 25, 50, 75, and 100 points, respectively, for answers leading up to the most positive. Likewise, a
question with only four possible answers would be scaled using points of 0, 33.3, 66.6, and 100. If a
subset of the answers are missing, we simply use the the answered questions.
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The lower rows of Table 2.1 provide information on the values of our survey
measures in the year that students were tested. Compared to the sample as a whole,
students with scores near the cutoff have considerably worse survey outcomes and,
even within the sample near the cutoff, students who passed both exams have better
parental survey outcomes (about 0.1 standard deviations) and better sense of personal
safety (0.07 standard deviations). We also see consistent differences if we compare
students who were promoted vs. those who were retained among students who failed
at least one of their exams. Thus, it is again evident that there is positive selection
of students for promotion among those who fail the exams, reinforcing the need for a
credible identification strategy that addresses potential selection on unobservables.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
Each student has two scores (ELA and mathematics) that affect his/her retention
outcome. We define our running variable as an index for each student i at year t
who is in grade g: Indexi,t = min(ELAi,t − Cutofft,g,ELA,Math − Cutofft,g,Math).
We define failure by Fi,t = 1(Indexi,t < 0). A student whose index falls below zero
must have failed at least one of the two tests and, as we show below, is therefore
significantly more likely to be retained.
To illustrate our identification strategy, we plot the percentage of students who
repeat a grade the following year against the test score index (Figure 2.2), dividing
the sample by whether the test was taken in a grade-year cell before or after the
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implementation of the more intensive test-based retention policy.14 Students who
failed at least one test by a wide margin (i.e. an index score at or below -10) had
a probability of grade repetition of about 20 percent prior to the new regime and
almost 60 percent after the more intensive policy took effect. In both pre- and post-
policy testing, the probability of retention decreases steadily as the index improves,
and students with an index value of -1 had grade repetition rates of around 5 percent
and a little over 20 percent, respectively, pre- and post-policy change. There is a
discontinuous drop in retention at an index value of 0, i.e. students who just reached
the cutoff. Students with non-negative index scores within two points of the cutoff
have rates of retention below 2 percent, and students with index values at 3 or above
have practically zero chance of being retained. This discontinuous drop in retention
across the zero index threshold is the basis for our identification of the impact of
grade repetition. It is clear, however, that our statistical power is greatly amplified
in the grades and years when the more stringent retention policy is in effect. We
return to this issue below.
In our data we essentially have 25 quasi-experiments — five test years and five
tested grades — and we combine them for our analyses. As noted before, some
grades/years are affected by a more intensive retention policy regime, and the exact
cutoff score for failing the tests varies by grade and year. To accommodate these
factors, we allow each test grade in each year to have its own control function but
impose the same retention jump at the cutoff within each policy regime and a single
14Appendix Figure A21 plots the discontinuity of retention at the cutoff in each grade-year cell.
The post-policy retention rates are much larger than the pre-policy retention rates. This pattern
supports our empirical strategy.
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Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). Later we will explore allowing the LATE to
differ by policy regime.
We use two-stage least squares for estimation:
ri,t = θ1 ∗ 1(Indexi,t < 0) + θ2 ∗ policyt,g ∗ 1(Indexi,t < 0) (2.1)
+Gt,g(indexi,t) + FE + µi,t
Yi,t,l = σ ∗ r̂i,t +Gt,g(indexi,t) + FE + ηi,t,l (2.2)
Each observation is represented by student i, test year t, and the number of years
l (“lag”) between when the test was taken and when the outcome Yi,t,l is measured.
ri,t is an indicator of retention in year t (r̂i,t is the predicted value from equation 1)
and does not vary between lags; policyt,g indicates whether individual i is enrolled at
time t in a grade g affected by the new policy regime; and Gt,g(indexi,t) is a grade-
year specific cubic function of index. We include grade × year fixed effects to account
for different cutoffs between years and grades and also outcome grade fixed effects to
separate out grade effects on survey responses. Our outcomes Yi,t,l include normalized
test scores, absences, suspension from school, students’ overall satisfaction, personal
sense of safety, and perception of the environment, and parents’ overall satisfaction,
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and perception of school safety within three years after test year t, i.e., l ∈ (0, 1, 2, 3).
We stack each observation in the administrative datasets up to four times to match
with both current outcomes and future outcomes within three years following the ini-
tial retention decision. Appendix Table A10 provides an illustrative example. Given
that we observe the same student multiple times in the data, we cluster standard
errors at student level. 15 We choose the index range of [-5,5] as our main bandwidth
and check other bandwidths for robustness. We also present an analysis that includes
8th grade tests and the spring 2009 tests as a robustness check.
Stacking the datasets allows us to evaluate the effects of retention on current and
future outcomes in one regression by interacting Equation 1 with lag l. This pooled
set-up provides two advantages. First, we simultaneously run placebo tests (l = 0)
and observe how effects change over time (l = 1, 2, 3).16 Second, we can control for
outcome grade fixed effects. Since retained students will mechanically attend lower
grade levels than their promoted peers, estimates that do not control for grade level
effects might conflate any systematic effects of grade level with the effects of retention.
Stacking the datasets and combining quasi-experiments allows us to identify outcome
grade fixed effects by looking at multiple cohorts and multiple lags simultaneously.
To support the validity of a regression discontinuity design (RDD), it is important
that scores are not manipulated around the cutoff. There is little reason to believe
15As a robustness check (see section 4.4), we also implement two-way clustering at both the
student and index level (Lee and Card (2008)). Clustering at the index level has become somewhat
standard practice in the RD literature, but we see little reason to believe that our survey outcomes
are correlated at the index level due to common shocks. In the absence of these shocks, clustering
at the index level can do more harm than good (see Koles￿r and Rothe (2016)).
16The outcomes when l = 0 were realized before any retention decisions, and we run placebo
tests by examining the effects of retention on them.
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such manipulation takes places, as the math and English tests are developed and
graded externally to the school district, and Figure 2.3 shows that the density of
observations at each index runs smoothly across the cutoff.17 Further evidence that
there is no manipulation is provided in Figure 2.4, which shows that the percentage
of female students and students who receive free/reduced price lunch are also smooth
through the cutoff. Appendix B provides additional continuity graphs and regression
analyses of other covariates, including attrition rates and survey response rates.
Before proceeding to our results, it is worth nothing that we cannot pin down the
mechanisms underlying any effects of retention on parents’ and students’ views on the
quality of education being provided. There are obvious potential mechanisms such as
seeing the same material twice and being moved to a younger peer group. There can
also be various other mechanisms driven by the “labelling” of retained students at
the start of the next school year, e.g., negative effects associated with stigmatization
by classmates or positive effects of increased attention from teachers. Very much in
line with previous studies of retention, we do not seek to separate out these potential
channels but, rather, to provide greater insight into the (local) effects of a widespread
policy.
17In contrast, Dee et al. (2016) show that exams taken by high school students and graded locally




Formal estimates of the impact of test failure on retention are presented in Table
2.2. The first stage is strong and the coefficients are consistent regardless of whether
we include all students (Column 1) or restrict the sample to students for whom we
have any survey data, parental survey data, or student survey data (Columns 2 to
4, respectively). Consistent with Figure 2.2, failing at least one test increases the
probability of being retained by around 3 percent under the less intensive policy
regime and by around 25 percent under the more intensive policy regime.
The Effects of Retention on Non-Survey Outcomes
The main contribution of our paper is to examine how retention affects subjective
measures such as parental satisfaction about educational quality. However, in order
to provide comparisons with earlier literature and some context for interpreting the
survey evidence, we first present effects of retention on test scores, school absences,
suspensions, subsequent grade repetition, and subsequent receipt of special education
services. Graphical evidence is shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6, which plot residuals from
a regression of each outcome on grade × year fixed effects against our index variable,
while Table 2.3 presents point estimates from regressions based on Equations 1 and
2.
Figure 2.5 shows outcomes in the year of the test (l = 0) and is therefore akin to
a placebo, since retention decisions are made after these measures are taken. Con-
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sequently, there is no visual evidence of a significant jump at the cutoff, and the
estimates in Row 1 of Table 2.3 confirm this conclusion. Figure 2.6 shows future
outcomes, combining all data within three years after the test (l ∈ (1, 2, 3)) for sim-
plicity. Figure 2.6a and 2.6b show that test scores relative to same-grade peers are
dramatically higher for students who just fall below the cutoff on at least one exam;
estimated effects of retention in Table 2.3 are 0.55 and 0.63 standard deviations for
English and math, respectively.18 These results are consistent with Jacob and Lefgren
(2004b), Schwerdt, West, and Winters (2015), and Mariano and Martorell (2013). Of
course, retained students take different tests and, as discussed in the introduction, we
cannot interpret these results as an improvement in academic achievement without
further assumptions. Any effect on absences and suspensions over the following three
years (Figures 2.6c and 2.6d) is difficult to discern graphically, and regression esti-
mates in Table 2.3 suggest being retained has little impact on aggregate absences and
some (marginally significant) effect on suspension over the subsequent three years.19
Figure 2.6e shows that students just below the cutoff are more likely to receive special
education within three years after the test; Table 2.3 indicates an point estimate of
18An important issue to consider is that failing an exam can have a discontinuous effect on ed-
ucational experience outside of retention, such as having to attend summer school. If, for example,
summer school leads to improved achievement, regardless of retention outcomes, then our inter-
pretation of the two-stage least squares estimates may be incorrect. To shed some light on this
issue, we present some admittedly suggestive evidence in Appendix Figure A22, which takes average
future test scores for students with index values below zero and plots them separately for retained
and non-retained students. We can see that the future scores of non-retained students are quite
continuous through the cutoff, while those of retained students are discontinuously higher. While
retention within the set of students below the cutoff is obviously endogenous, we believe this graph
is reassuring that our RD estimates are driven through the effects of retention, rather than other
experiences related to having failed an exam.
19When we expand the bandwidth for analysis, the effect on suspension becomes small (about
2%) and statistically insignificant. We use two-stage least squares to estimate the effect of retention
on suspension, a binary variable, but estimates from a probit model, not shown here, lead to the
same conclusions.
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5.7% (more than twice the sample average after the tests). Although classification
of special education follows some absolute standard, parents may see retention as a
signal and react by seeking additional assistance through special education. This reac-
tion seems more natural since special education exempts students from the retention
policy in NYC. 20
Students who barely pass exams and avoid retention in a given year may have
significantly higher probabilities of failing and/or being retained in the future. The
tendency for students who initially act as the “control group” to be given the “treat-
ment” of grade retention at a later date can dampen our estimated effects of retention
at time t for lags greater than 1. In Column 1 of Table 2.4, we present estimates
of the effect of retention on grade level at one, two, and three years after the exam
(l = 1, 2, 3). The (mechanical) coefficient of 1.00 at l = 1 fades slightly to 0.96 at
l = 2 and slides further to 0.90 at l = 3, suggesting that 10 percent of students who
would have been retained had they not barely passed their exams are still retained
at some point within three years. This “fade-out” of the first-stage effects of fail-
ure on retention in NYCDOE is somewhat smaller than what Schwerdt, West, and
Winters (2015) document in the state of Florida, where approximately 17 percent of
the “marginally promoted” students are retained within three years and 25 percent
retained within five years. Not surprisingly then, the effects of retention on academic
performance relative to same grade peers is largest at l = 1 (0.66 in English, 0.79 in
20We suspect that parents may react to failing exams instead of retention and plot the average
probability of receiving special education separately by whether the students below the cutoff are
actually retained or not in Appendix Figure A22. Although retention is endegenous, we are assured
by this figure that our result is driven by actual retention.
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math), and declines through l = 3 (.36 in English, 0.39 in math). This pattern is
also unsurprising given the wider literature documenting “fade-out” of the impacts of
academic interventions on standardized test scores (e.g., Cascio and Staiger (2012)
and Chetty et al. (2011)), but it is notable that retention has substantial positive
effects on test scores – relative to same-grade peers – several years later. 21
The Effects of Retention on Survey Outcomes
In this section, we turn to our main outcomes of interest from parent and student
surveys. As in the previous section, we provide graphical evidence first by regressing
each survey outcome on grade × year fixed effects and outcome grade fixed effects
and plot the average residual at each index around the cutoff. Before we present
figures, it is worth emphasizing that only students above 6th grade respond to surveys
and results on student surveys does not necessarily apply to students in elementary
schools. Figure 2.7 shows results pooling surveys taken in the three years after the
test.22 Panel A of Figure 2.7 shows a clear jump in parental satisfaction at the
cutoff; parents whose children barely passed the tests are less satisfied than parents
whose children barely failed. It is also interesting to note that, while there is a weak
positive relationship between satisfaction and index above the cutoff, the relationship
below the cutoff is strongly negative, which mirrors the “first-stage” relationship of
21The results on absences and suspensions are mostly unaffected and not shown here. The results
on special education is not shown here because the standard errors in this specification cannot be
computed.
22Appendix Figure A23 shows there is no evidence of “placebo” effects for surveys taken in the
year of the test; recall that the surveys are administered after the tests but prior to scores being
known or retention decisions being made.
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index with retention. We also see a smaller and slightly less clear jump at the cutoff in
students’ sense of safety, while students’ overall satisfaction, students’ views about the
school environment, and parents’ beliefs about school safety appear fairly continuous
through the cutoff.
Before moving to our regression results, we provide two more pieces of graphical
evidence, focusing on parental satisfaction and students’ sense of safety. First, we plot
results separately for tests in grade-year cells with and without the more stringent
retention policy (Figure 2.8). For both outcomes, we see clear discontinuities in survey
outcomes in the post-policy grade-year cells, with more positive survey responses
among students who just failed one of their exams, but no noticeable change at the
cutoff in the pre-policy years.23 The fact that we see clearer patterns in the policy
years may simply be due to the first stage being dramatically stronger when the
policy was in place. However, given the large (and not uncontroversial) increase in
retention brought about by the policy change, the evidence of positive effects on
parental satisfaction is interesting. Second, we plot average outcomes for students
below the cutoff separately by whether or not the student was actually retained
(Figure 2.9). Retention is clearly endogenous, as we cannot separate students to the
right of the cutoff by whether or not they would have been retained if the cutoff
were higher. However, this plot is reassuring, albeit only suggestive, as it shows that
the differences across the threshold seen in Figure 2.7 are driven by relatively high
parental satisfaction and sense of safety among retained students; the outcomes for
23In Appendix Figure A24, we replicate these plots using outcomes in the same year as the test
and show that, regardless of the policy in place, these outcomes are smooth through the cutoff.
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non-retained students below the cutoff appear to match in a very continuous manner
with outcomes for students above the cutoff.
Regression results in Table 2.5 are largely consistent with what we observe in the
figures described above. Retained students’ parents are estimated to be 5.4 points (or
0.3 standard deviations) happier than promoted students’ parents in the three years
following the retention decision. We also find that retained students feel 5.4 points
(0.25 standard deviations) safer than promoted ones in the years following the re-
tention decision, while the effects on parental views on school safety, students’ views
on school environment, and students’ overall satisfaction are statistically insignifi-
cant.24 The difference between students’ personal sense of safety and their views
on the school environment (which include measures of school safety) is instructive.
Retained students feel that personally they are more safe, even though their general
views of safety at the school level and other measures of school environmental quality
are unchanged.25
Rather than pooling up to three years, it is interesting to ask whether the effects
of retention grow or decay over time. Table 2.6 presents separate estimates of the
effects of retention after one, two, and three years, focusing on parental satisfaction
24Tests for “placebo effects” on survey outcomes in the year of the test (l = 0) do not reveal any
statistically significant coefficients. Though the placebo coefficient for students’ sense of safety is
somewhat large, it is of the opposite sign as the main effect of interest and suggests that, if anything,
students just to the left of the cutoff felt somewhat less safe in the year prior to the retention decision.
25It is also interesting that parental satisfaction improves while students’ overall satisfaction
appears unaffected. The parental surveys include students tested below grade 6, and this difference
in sample could conceivably make a difference. However, in results not reported here, we find that
the effect on parental satisfaction is significant and quite similar in magnitude if we limit to parents
whose students were tested in grades 6 and higher. While we lack data to explore this issue further,
it is worth noting that Rockoff and Turner (2010) find that short-run improvements in student
achievement caused by the NYCDOE accountability system also led parents, but not students, to
be happier with the quality of education they received.
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and students’ personal safety. We find that retained students’ parents are slightly
less satisfied (although not statistically significant) with their child’s education in
the year after retention, but significantly happier (roughly 35 percent of a standard
deviation) two and three years after retention. The fact that we see an immediate
improvement in academic performance (at least relative to same-grade peers) but a
delayed effect on parental satisfaction is interesting. On one hand, it may be that
satisfaction from academic improvement is wiped out by negative aspects of retention
(e.g., stigma). On the other hand, since surveys are administered before test results
are known each year, it may be that parents do not know how much their child has
improved (at least relative to his/her new same-grade peers) one year after retention.
One might naturally wonder whether improvements in test scores relative to same-
grade peers might possibly explain the positive effects on parental satisfaction that we
find over three years. This is an important issue; if parents simply value their child’s
performance rank relative to same-grade peers, then retention may simply re-order
students so that parents of those retained are happier but parents of low-achieving
students in the younger cohort are made less happy. 26 A purely ordinal interpretation
would essentially mean that retention is a zero-sum game.27 To investigate this
question a bit further, we ran cross sectional regressions of parental satisfaction on
on students’ test scores and find that a one standard deviation increase in both
mathematics and ELA test scores increases parental satisfaction by about 1.3 points.
26Lavy, Paserman, and Schlosser (2012) report that low-achieving students defined as those who
repeat grades are more satisfied with their teachers at the expense of regular students.
27The importance of ordinal rank has been shown in the workplace (Card et al., 2012) as well as
in educational contexts (Murphy and Weinhardt, 2014).
66
This does not represent a causal estimate of the impact of test score performance on
satisfaction, and there are several reasons to think such coefficients might be biased
upward. Nevertheless, if we apply this coefficient, test scores would explain less than
25 percent of the effect of retention on parental satisfaction. We cannot rule out that
improvements in performance relative to a new, younger peer group explains some of
our results, nor that parents do not care about ordinal rank, but it is unlikely that
these factors are the main drivers of our findings.
The pattern of effects on students’ personal sense of safety in Table 2.6 reveal a
different pattern, with the largest effect in the first year after retention (about half
a standard deviation) and positive but gradually declining effects over the next two
years. One interpretation is that students feel much safer when enrolled alongside
younger peers, and that this age advantage grows less important over time. We
explore the explanatory power of a relative-age effect by running a cross-sectional
regression of students’ personal sense of safety on students’ relative age for students
who have never been retained; this yields a coefficient that implies that the oldest
child in a class responds only about 0.75 points (0.04 standard deviations) higher on
average than the youngest child to the questions about personal safety. Thus, the
marginal students who are retained due to test failure would have to be much more
sensitive than the typical student to their age position for this to explain the effects
we find on personal safety.
As mentioned above, we are also interested in whether the effects of retention differ
between the pre- and post-policy retention regimes. Estimated effects of retention
on parental satisfaction and students’ safety that are allowed to differ between policy
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regimes (Table 2.7) show that our main findings are driven by the grade-year cells
in the new policy regime. The point estimates of the old policy regime for parental
satisfaction and students’ safety are both negative but statistically insignificant and
very imprecisely estimated. This is not terribly surprising since the first stage power
under the old policy regime is rather weak. However, similar estimation with test
scores as the outcome (Appendix Table A11) shows that the effects of retention on
academic performance relative to same-grade peers is remarkably similar in the pre-
and post-policy periods. If the effect of retention on parental satisfaction is simply
due to academic improvement, we should see similar effects between the two policy
regimes but we do not. 28
Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we present four robustness checks that further support our main
findings. First, we re-analyze the effects of retention on parental satisfaction and
students’ personal safety while widening our bandwidths in one point increments from
[-4,4] through [-10,10] (see Appendix Table A12). Our point estimates for effects on
parental satisfaction are quite insensitive to bandwidth. Indeed, the only noticeable
change is that the coefficient for a “placebo effect” of retention on students’ current
(i.e., pre-retention) sense of personal safety goes closer towards zero as the bandwidth
widens, while the estimated effect on students’ future sense of personal safety remain
quite stable. Thus, we do not find any evidence that the choice of bandwidth is
28We have also examined heterogeneous effects between male and female students and between
younger and older students within a cohort but we fail to find any significant differences.
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driving our results.
Second, we note that Lee and Card (2008) suggests RDDs should cluster errors
at the running variable level to minimize specification errors and this practice has
become somewhat standard. However, we see little reason to perform this clustering
practice because our outcomes are not subject to any common shocks at the index
level and Koles￿r and Rothe (2016) suggests that this practice may do more hard
than good. Nevertheless, we implement a two-way clustering at both the individual
and index level in order to make sure that this does not have a major impact on our
statistical inference. Reassuringly, we find that the two-way clustered standard errors
are quite similar to clustering at the student level (see Appendix Tables A13, A14,
and A15).
Third, recall that we do not examine retention in grade 8 or in the school year
2009-2010 in our main results. We omit these observations because we are only able to
observe the retention decision and future outcomes of students in 8th grade (and/or
tested in school year 2009-2010) if they stayed in the New York City public school
system in the next year and they (or their parents) responded to the surveys. In
other words, we cannot distinguish between a student who was promoted to grade
9 and left NYC schools from a student who was promoted but did not respond to
the NYC survey, nor can we measure retention for students who were tested in 2011
who did not respond to surveys. The addition of these observations to regressions of
parental satisfaction and students’ sense of personal safety (see Appendix Table A7,
A8, and A9) do not significantly alter our main findings.
Last, but not least, retention may induce students to trasfer to another school
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and, as we investigated before, to seek assistance through special education. We
include the number of years a student has spent in a school, the type of the school, or
an indicator of receiving special education as additional covariates in our estimation.
These results are shown in Table A16 and similar to our previous estimates. 29
2.5 Regression Discontinuity Extrapolation
Our regression discontinuity design identifies a local average treatment effect (LATE)
for students near the cutoff, but we are also interested in the effect of retention on
inframarginal students. We follow recent research in regression discontinuity tech-
niques (Angrist and Rokkanen (2015)) to identify LATEs on students away from the
cutoff.
In addition to standard RDD assumptions, this technique requires a Conditional
Independence Assumption (CIA) and Common Support (CS). CIA requires the po-
tential outcomes to be mean-independent of the running variable after conditioning
on other pre-determined covariates; CS requires treatment status to vary conditional
on these covariates. Following Angrist and Rokkanen (ibid.), we test the CIA assump-
tion by regressing our survey outcomes on predetermined covariates (e.g., two-year
prior test scores), and then examining the relationship between residuals of this re-
gression and our running variable on each side of the cutoff.30 We focus on the grades
and years under the new policy regime to maximize the power of first stage and
29Note that the sample size is different from previous estimation because of missing data.
30Specifically, we use standardized mathematics and ELA test scores from one year before each
student’s current (i.e. using scores a student obtained in 2006 as conditioning covariates of his/her
2007 running variable) as well as gender, ethnicity, free lunch status, and grade × year fixed effects.
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explore LATEs on students’ personal sense of safety and parental satisfaction.
Results for tests of the CIA assumption (Appendix Table A17 and Appendix
Figure A25) show that, conditional on our pre-determined covariates, the relationship
between parental satisfaction and the running variable is no longer significant, but
the relationship between students’ personal safety and the running variable remains.
Thus, we only have support for the CIA assumption with respect to the parental
satisfaction outcome.
We indirectly test CS by checking the distribution of pre-determined covariates at
each index score. Appendix Figure A26 shows a box plot of two-year prior standard-
ized mathematics scores at each index score. The extensive coverage at each index
score supports CS.
We calculate a linear reweighting estimator discussed in Kline (2011) to estimate
LATEs of retention on parental satisfaction at each index score over the range -11
to 6, which is the largest range of our running variable in which the test of the CIA
assumption holds. The estimator is equal to:
E(Y1i − Y0i|xi, ri)
E(W1i −W0i|xi, ri) =
E(Y1i|xi, ri)− E(Y0i|xi, ri)
E(W1i|xi, ri)− E(W0i|xi, ri) (2.3)
in which Y1i and Y0i denote the potential outcomes when treated and untreated, xi
are the conditioning covariates, ri is the running variable, and W1i and W0i denote
the potential treatment (retention) status. Kline’s estimator assumes linear models
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for conditional means:
E(yi|xi, ri < 0) = x′iβ1
E(yi|xi, ri ≧ 0) = x′iβ0
E(wi|xi, ri < 0) = x′iδ1
E(wi|xi, ri ≧ 0) = x′iδ0 (2.4)
in which yi is the realized outcome and wi is the realized treatment. These linear
models reduce the estimator to:
(β1 − β0)′E(xi|ri = c)
(δ1 − δ0)′E(xi|ri = c) . (2.5)
Implicitly we assume the linear models for the conditional mean at each side of
the cutoff are the same. In practice, we first use observations with ri < 0 and regress
yi on xi to estimate β1 and, likewise, use observations with ri ≧ 0 and regress yi on xi
to estimate β0. We apply an analogous procedure to estimate δ0 and δ1. Armed with
these estimates and our predetermined covariates, we calculate the estimator based on
Equation 5.31 We compute the standard errors by bootstrapping non-parametrically
with 500 replications. Our estimates, displayed in Figure 2.10, suggest that the
impact of retention on parental satisfaction would be smallest (roughly 2 points)
among students with scores well below the threshold, roughly constant (around 6
31To align with our estimates in section 4, we also include indicators of survey grade to estimate
β0 and β1. Since we passed the CIA test without including them, controlling for them in the
estimation does not bias our results.
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points, equivalent to our RDD estimate) in the range of index scores between -5
and +2, and then slope upward until reaching 11 points for students with an index
score of 6. Our confidence intervals become quite wide for estimates farther away
from the cutoff, but the evidence clearly suggests larger positive treatment effects on
parental satisfaction for students who passed the exams by at least 3-4 index points.
Of course, these effects apply only to students who would have been retained after
the process of portfolio review, summer school, and re-testing, and our estimates of
δ0 and δ1 suggest that a relatively small fraction of these students (16%) would have
been retained. Interestingly, these results are not consistent with our prior beliefs,
which were that the positive effects of retention would have been greatest among
students scoring well below the cutoff; these “inframarginal” students have far higher
retention rates which suggested to us that school officials and parents are more likely
to agree that retention would be a beneficial educational intervention for the child.
2.6 Conclusion
We examine variation in grade retention stemming from policies in New York City
public schools which create discontinuities in the relationship between retention prob-
ability and test scores. Merging administrative data on student enrollment and test-
ing with self-reports by students and parents about the quality of their educational
experience, we contribute to the literature on the effects of retention by examining
outcomes which, unlike test scores, can be easily compared across students in differ-
ent grade levels. We find that students retained in NYC as a result of the district’s
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more stringent test-based retention policy saw significant improvements in parental
satisfaction with the quality of their child’s education and students’ personal sense
of safety. We provide evidence that suggests these effects are driven by factors be-
yond attending summer school, changes in age relative to classmates, or changes in
performance on high stakes tests relative to same-grade peers. However, there are
many additional ways in which retention can alter a student’s school experience, and
we lack the data to examine these other various channels.
Additionally, we use recently developed econometric methods to examine treat-
ment effects of retention away from the cutoff and find suggestive evidence that the
positive effects of this retention policy on parental satisfaction might be even greater
for students scoring above the cutoff than those below. Our results thus provide an
important and broadened look at the effects of grade retention. While the long-term
academic and labor market outcomes of retained students are of ultimate interest,
the opinions of parents and students about educational quality govern many of the
educational investment decisions made in society. As such, they are an important




Figure 2.1: Timing and Process for Testing, Surveys, and Promotion Decisions
Note: Information on the timing and elements of promotion decisions is sourced largely
from Crego et al. (2009).
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Figure 2.2: Test-Score Based Retention Under Two Policy Regimes
Note: This figure plots the average percentage of retained students at each index score,
where a score of zero is equal to the cutoff for passing both exams. Retention rates are
plotted separately by policy regime, where “post-policy” designates grade-year cells that
have implemented a more stringent test-based retention policy.
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Figure 2.3: Density of Observations Across Cutoffs
Note: Each point represents the density of student test scores at each index score in our
sample.
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Figure 2.4: Continuity of Covariates Across Cutoffs
(A) Female
(B) Free/Reduced Price Lunch
Note: Each point represents the percentage of students who are female (Panel A) or receive
free/reduced price lunch (Panel B) at each index score.
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Figure 2.5: Continuity of Current Test Scores, Absences, and Suspension
(A) Mathematics (B) ELA
(C) Absences (D) Suspended from School
Note: These figures plot residuals from regressions of current test scores, absences, and an
indicator for being suspended from school on test grade by test year fixed effects. ELA
stands for the English Language Arts exam.
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Figure 2.6: Evidence on Future Test Scores, Absences, Suspension, and Special Ed-
ucation
(A) Mathematics (B) ELA
(C) Absences (D) Suspended from School
(E) Special Education
Note: These figures plot residuals from regressions of future test scores, absences, an in-
dicator for being suspended from school, and probability of receiving special education on
test grade by test year fixed effects. ELA stands for the English Language Arts exam.
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Figure 2.7: Effects on Future Survey Responses
(A) Parental Satisfaction (B) Parent Sense of Overall Safety
(C) Student Satisfaction (D) Student Personal Safety
(E) Student Sense of Environment
Note: These figures plot residuals from regressions of future parental satisfaction, parental
sense of overall safety, student satisfaction, student safety, and student sense of environment
on test grade by test year fixed effects and survey grade fixed effects.
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Figure 2.8: Effects on Future Survey Responses by Policies
(A) Pre-policy Parental Satisfaction (B) Post-policy Parental Satisfaction
(C) Pre-policy Student Personal Safety (D) Post-policy Student Personal Safety
Note: These figures plot residuals from regressions of future parental satisfaction and stu-
dent sense of personal safety on test grade by test year fixed effects and survey grade fixed
effects. Plots are done separately for test grade-test year cells with and without the more
stringent retention policy in effect.
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Figure 2.9: Effects on Future Survey Responses by Actual Retention
(A) Parental Satisfaction
(B) Student Personal Safety
Note: These figures plot residuals from regressions of future survey responses on test grade
by test year fixed effects. Plots are done separately for students who failed at least one test
and were retained (yellow triangle), failed at least one of the tests but were not retained
(circle on the left side of cutoff), and students who passed both tests (circle on the right
side of cutoff).
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Figure 2.10: CIA Estimates for Parental Satisfaction
Note: We use an estimator discussed in Kline (2011) to calculate a local average treatment
effect of retention on future parental satisfaction; see the text of the paper for details. The
figure plots the point estimate and its 95% confidence interval by index score.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variables Full RD Sample Failing SampleBelow Above Retain Promote
ELA Score 0.20 (0.88) -0.8 -0.46 -1.06 -0.76
[Student-Test Observation] [1,486,419] [106,247] [236,581] [12,882] [85,768]
Math Score 0.18 (0.89) -0.77 -0.4 -1.01 -0.723
(Standard Deviation) [1,493,253] [106,247] [236,581] [12,882] [85,768]
Failing ELA 6.10% 48% 0% 55% 47%
Failing Math 8.10% 65% 0% 68% 64%
Retained 2% 13% 0.80% 100% 0%
Ever Retained 5.70% 21% 9.20% 100% 10%
Ever Exempt 5.5% 10% 6.4% 15% 9.8%
Female 51% 49% 50% 47% 50%
Asian 13.20% 3.50% 5.10% 2.40% 3.70%
Hispanic 34.60% 37.80% 40% 35.60% 38.30%
Black 36.30% 52.50% 46.80% 58% 51.50%
White 15.20% 5.50% 7.40% 3.30% 5.80%
Other/Unknown 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70%
Free Lunch 86% 95% 93% 96% 94%
Absences 12 (11.4) 17 14.7 20.6 16.3
Suspended from School 3% 5.40% 4% 7% 5%
Parental Satisfaction 74.16 (16.73) 70.13 71.82 68.42 70.54
[Number of Survey Responses] [186,817] [3,652] [15,268] [695] [2,736]
Parent feels school is safe 80.64 (22.81) 73.97 76.6 72.59 74.34
[170,160] [3,289] [13,774] [622] [2,466]
Student is satisfied 71.53 (15.46) 69.21 69.12 67.98 69.72
[186,645] [4,963] [17,829] [1,131] [3,468]
Student feels safe 80.72 (20.87) 73.14 74.5 71.99 73.68
[181,674] [4,656] [17,065] [1,045] [3,268]
Student likes environment 53.27 (17.86) 49.45 49.25 48.68 49.79
[186,497] [4,951] [17,799] [1,127] [3,463]
Note: Test Scores are normalized within each grade × year to have a mean of zero and
a standard deviation of one. Absences are capped at 50 days per year and suspension is
an indicator for being suspended at least once during the school year. ELA stands for the
English Language Arts exam. 2.1% of students are classified as special education in the
following three years after being tested. Full Sample include every student except English
learners and special education students. RD Sample includes the students in the 11 points
window around the cutoff and serve as our main sample for analysis. Failing Sample includes
those below the cutoff in the RD Sample.
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Table 2.2: First Stage Regression Results
Full Survey Parent Student
Variables Retention Retention Retention Retention
Pre-Policy Failure 0.0334*** 0.0285*** 0.0302*** 0.0262***
(0.00189) (0.00232) (0.00369) (0.00236)
Post-Policy Failure 0.211*** 0.225*** 0.215*** 0.263***
(0.0104) (0.0131) (0.0162) (0.0186)
Observations 319,549 199,993 111,315 144,456
R-squared 0.167 0.170 0.188 0.141
Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year control
functions of student’s index score. The full sample includes everyone in the RD sample, the
survey sample includes everyone who or whose parent has ever responded to the survey, the
parent sample includes everyone whose parent has ever responded to the survey, and the
student sample includes everyone who has ever responded to the survey.
Table 2.3: Effects on Test Scores, Absences, Suspension, and Special Ed
Variable ELA Math Absences Suspension Special Ed
Retention [placebo] -0.00597 0.00129 -0.409 -0.00369 0(0.0391) (0.0375) (1.106) (0.0186) (0)
Retention [future] 0.546*** 0.628*** 0.533 0.0481* 0.0570**(0.0477) (0.0556) (1.537) (0.0249) (0.0231)
Observations 939,661 939,962 945,555 945,555 945,898
R-squared 0.190 0.214 0.035 0.021 0.043
Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year control
functions of student’s index score. [placebo] stands for coefficients on current outcome and
[future] stands for coefficients on the average outcome in the next three years after tests.
Test Scores are normalized within each grade × year to have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one. ELA stands for the English Language Arts exam. Absences are capped
at 50 days per year and suspension is an indicator for being suspended at least once during
the school year.
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Table 2.4: Persistent Effects of Retention on Test Scores, Absences, and Suspension
Variable Grade ELA Math
Retention [placebo] 0.000920 -0.00597 0.00129(0.00100) (0.0391) (0.0375)
Retention [l = 1] -0.999*** 0.664*** 0.788***(0.00100) (0.0481) (0.0537)
Retention [l = 2] -0.958*** 0.447*** 0.497***(0.0299) (0.0694) (0.0782)
Retention [l = 3] -0.901*** 0.362*** 0.386***(0.0380) (0.0836) (0.100)
Observations 1,021,380 939,661 939,962
R-squared 0.991 0.194 0.215
Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year control
functions of student’s index score. l = 1, 2, 3 stands for coefficients on next-year, two-year-
later, and three-year-later outcomes, respectively. Test scores are normalized within each
grade × year to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. ELA stands for the
English Language Arts exam.











Retention [placebo] 0.235 -2.611 1.731 -6.091 -0.237(5.025) (7.325) (2.535) (3.935) (2.899)
Retention [future] 5.138** -0.716 -0.113 6.133** 2.833(2.375) (3.411) (1.840) (2.637) (2.086)
Observations 163,594 148,330 319,109 307,465 318,533
R-squared 0.042 0.047 0.032 0.008 0.016
Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year control
functions of student’s index score and survey grade fixed effects. [placebo] stands for coef-
ficients on current outcome and [future] stands for coefficients on the average outcome in
the next three years after tests.
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Retention [placebo] 0.235 -6.091(5.025) (3.935)
Retention [l = 1] -1.091 11.72*(6.563) (6.577)
Retention [l = 2] 6.558 9.703*(4.862) (4.989)
Retention [l = 3] 5.244 7.570(4.772) (5.792)
Observations 163,594 307,465
R-squared 0.044 0.012
Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year con-
trol functions of student’s index score and survey grade fixed effects. [placebo] stands for
coefficients on current outcome and [l = 1, 2, 3] stands for coefficients on next-year, two-
year-later, and three-year-later outcomes, respectively.






Post-policy retention [placebo] -0.211 -5.961(5.149) (4.051)
Pre-policy retention [placebo] 10.63 -8.385(23.20) (16.74)
Post-policy retention [future] 5.495** 6.527**(2.396) (2.662)
Pre-policy retention [future] -7.617 -8.829(11.82) (12.41)
Observations 163,594 307,465
R-squared 0.038 0.006
Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year con-
trol functions of student’s index score and survey grade fixed effects. [future] stands for
coefficients on the average outcome in the next three years after tests.
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Chapter 3
Reviewing and Reassessing Children First in New York City
3.1 Introduction
When Michael Bloomberg took office as Mayor of New York City (NYC) in 2002,
he was determined to restructure the existing education system and bring about
radical changes to the system (Reid, 2003). He appointed Joel Klein, a lawyer from
outside the education establishment, as the chancellor, and launched a series of policy
changes, which are collectively known as Children First. During his 12-year tenure
as the mayor, he dismantled the hierarchical education system, restructured school
management, improved school finance, and reformed the workforce.
NYC is the largest school district in the United States with 1.1 million students in
over 1,800 schools under the governance of New York City Department of Education
(NYCDOE) (NYCDOE, 2017a). Children First significantly changed many aspects of
public education in NYC, and its effect on such a large number of students is already
an important subject. Moreover, Children First involved several types of education
policies, and studying these policies and their interactions provides valuable lessons
and experience for policy-makers in other urban school districts.
Understanding the impact of Children First is quite difficult for two reasons.
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First, it affected the entire city over 12 years, and many concurrent events may
confound the estimation of its impact. Second, Children First is a collection of
policies, and understanding it requires examining these policies separately as well as
their relationship, interconnection, and interaction.
To better understand Children First, I focus on three perspectives to analyze
this education reform. First, this paper summarizes the literature on the impact
of Children First as a whole and reviews studies examining the effectiveness of its
associated policy changes. Second, I use the synthetic control method to provide new
evidence of the overall impact of Children First on students’ test scores. Third, I
provide an economic analysis of how Children First affected the incentives, school
management, and education inputs to understand the advantages and disadvantages
of this reform.
In the first part of this paper, I present an overview of Children First and dis-
cuss studies of its overall impact. Children First can be understood as consisting
of three phases. The first phase (2002-2006) mainly involved mayoral control over
the city’s schools and several pilot and supporting programs, which laid the foun-
dation for further policy changes; the second phase (2007-2010) included large scale
implementation of policies across several areas; and the third phase (2011-2013) was
largely a continuation of the previous policies. The existing evidence (Blagg, 2016;
Elwick, 2017; Kemple, 2011; Reback, 2014; UFT, 2015, p. ...) regarding the overall
impact of Children First is limited, suggestive, and shows a mixed effect on student
performance.
The paper then outlines three areas of key policy changes in Children First and
90
its associated studies. The first and main policy change provided schools with greater
autonomy in school management in exchange for greater accountability pressure to
improve student performance. The other two areas support the main policy by in-
creasing financial resources and improving education workers in the district. Many
studies (Rockoff and Turner, 2010; Unterman, 2014, p. ...) have examined these poli-
cies individually and tend to find positive effects.
I adopt the synthetic control method to reassess the overall impact of Children
First and provide suggestive evidence of large positive effects on students’ math test
scores but not their English test scores. I compare NYC and a synthetic control group
generated from the other counties in the New York state by matching test scores and
student characteristics. However, the pre-treatment trend does not match well, and
these results should be interpreted with great caution.
Lastly, I provide an economic analysis of Children First to understand its advan-
tages and weaknesses. I show that the autonomy for accountability policy, the key
component of Children First, could solve a key issue in public education: “a multi-
task multi-principal nearly-monopoly organization with vague and poorly observable
goals” (Dixit, 2002). Also, additional funding and human capital improvement could
be complementary with autonomy, accountability, and other policies. Although the
previous policies may have been shown effective in some studies, resistance from the
unions and the large demand of Children First for resources may have diluted these
effects and prevented this education reform from fully realizing its potential. In ad-
dition, some of these policies might be simply redistributional: they improved some
students’ performance while harming others’.
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This paper makes three contributions. First, this paper provides up-to-date lit-
erature review of Children First and summarizes key studies on its associated policy
changes. Second, this paper provides new evidence on the overall impact of Children
First through the synthetic control method. Third, it includes an economic analysis
to understand why some policies are successful but the overall impact is weak.
3.2 An Overview of Children First
Prior to the Bloomberg Administration, there were four levels of management in
the public education system. From top to down, they were the mayoral office, the
elected board of education, 32 community school districts, and the schools. The
middle management was quite powerful: the board of education supervised the key
policy changes, and the community school districts were directly involved in policy
implementation and school management and decisions (Kelleher, 2014). This system
has been criticized due to nepotism, mismanagement, and corruption (Rogers, 2009).
In 2002, Mayor Bloomberg took control of the public education in NYC, and
reformed the existing district organization. The mayor applied his experience in
managing private companies to the school and appointed a new chancellor, Joel Klein,
to launch a large-scale school reform, known as Children First. The reform aimed
to reduce bureaucracy, centralize policy-making process, and provide schools with
support, autonomy, and accountability.
In the first phase of the reform (2002-2006), Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor
Klein centralized decision power and initiated a few supporting programs as prepa-
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ration for launching a series of more drastic policy changes. They first replaced the
elected board of education with the appointed Panel for Educational Policy, and re-
placed the 32 community school districts with 10 administrative regions, and later
with a three-pronged organizational structure. This reorganization laid down the
foundation for other policy changes. Afterward, they launched professional develop-
ment programs to train new principals, reduce the prevalence of unlicensed teachers,
and improve teacher quality. They also piloted a program known as Autonomy Zone
to offer schools greater autonomy in exchange for greater accountability.
In the second phase (2007-2010), Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Klein ex-
panded the Autonomy Zone to most of the city’s schools. Mayor Bloomberg allowed
the schools to have more flexibility in allocating budgets, hiring teachers, and de-
termining professional development. However, schools, principals, and teachers were
subject to performance reviews and faced severe consequences. They also adopted a
new financing scheme (Fair Student Funding) to allocate additional financial resources
to schools serving in-need students. A citywide data system and school support or-
ganizations were set up to support data-driven instructional practices and provide
assistance to school management.
The third phase (2011-2013) was largely devoted to sustaining the prior policy
changes, except for the sudden resignation of Chancellor Joel Klein, which was fol-
lowed by a three-month controversial appointment of Cathleen Black, former chair-
woman of Hearst Magazines (Gootman, 2010). Deputy Mayor Dennis Walcott took
over and continued the reform, particularly in improving teachers’ professional devel-
opment and evaluation.
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Children First was highly contentious, as it reformed the existing school system
and promoted business practices in public education, relying on market-based com-
petitive pressure and data-driven performance measures. For example, Giroux (2011)
criticized the reform and warned that business culture could disempower students
and teachers, shifting schools from developing students in a well rounded manner
to focusing on test preparation. On the other hand, (Elwick, 2017; Kelleher, 2014)
praised that the reform could reduce bureaucracy and provide higher quality educa-
tion. Traver (2006) emphasized that this reform failed to influence school and teacher
culture, a key aspect driving school effectiveness.
Quantitative evidence may provide a clearer sense of the effectiveness of Children
First, but caveats apply to these pieces of evidence. Because Children First was im-
plemented citywide, its effects may be confounded by other activities and events, such
as a stronger economic recovery after the 2001 financial recession (Reback, 2014). In
addition, NYC is unique in many aspects (such as size, demographics, and location),
and it is difficult to find comparable cities/counties to form a reasonable comparison
group.
Kemple (2011) provided probably the most compelling causal analysis of Chil-
dren First. He used a comparative interrupted time series analysis to show that stu-
dents’ test scores and high school graduation rate increased compared to a regression-
adjusted counterfactual using four other large school districts in New York State after
Children First was launched in 2003. Besides the above caveats, the results on high
school graduation rates are subject to miscalculation and alternative ways of accumu-
lating high school credits (Burke, Chapman, and Monahan, 2013; Office of the State
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Comptroller, 2014).
The results do not look as optimistic when we look at the test scores from the
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). Blagg (2016) compared the
change in students’ test scores from 2005 to 2013 for all urban districts under the
Trial Urban District Assessment program (TUDA) in NAEP. The average scale score
across 4th and 8th grade mathematics and reading tests in NYC increased 4 points.
This progress seems fine but places the city 11th out of 12 urban school districts in
TUDA. Based on this result, students in NYC did not experience faster growth in
test scores during this key period of Children First. It is noteworthy that other urban
districts such as Chicago and Boston also implemented similar reforms, so this result
might suggest that such reforms work better in other school districts.
Another caveat of such quantitative evidence is that it cannot evaluate the impact
of Children First on outcomes that are difficult to observe and measure. For exam-
ple, Giroux (2011) and Scott and DiMartino (2009) argue that such a reform might
undercut schools’ focus and efforts on improving students’ social values, imagination,
and civic courage, which are considered as key purposes of public education as well.
To conclude, Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Klein borrowed experience from
business practices to design Children First, which changed many aspect of public
education in NYC, from district organization to school responsibility. Because of
the massive scale of Children First, it is difficult to isolate its impact from other
concurrent events, and existing evidence suggests a mixed impact of this reform on
student performance.
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3.3 Policy Changes in Children First
This section summarizes the main policy changes in Children First and provides rele-
vant studies to understand their impact. Table 3.1 presents the timeline of the major
policies in Children First. These policy changes can be divided into three categories.
The centerpiece focused on restructuring school management and promoting new
school models. The two supporting pillars are remaking school budget and reforming
school workforces.
Restructuring School Management
A key aspect of Children First focused on restructuring the schools and intensifying
the competition across schools by closing low-performing schools, opening new and
more effective schools, and increasing school choice for students. These policies may
impose pressure on school leaders and induce greater school effort on students’ test
scores.
The city launched two key policies to provide accountability pressure to schools:
Quality Review provided qualitative evaluations from external consultants, and
Progress Report measured student performance in each school. Schools receiving low
grades from these two policies faced severe consequences such as removal of the prin-
cipal or closing the school. Rockoff and Turner (2010) used a regression-discontinuity
design and showed that receipt of a low grade from Progress Report significantly
increased students’ test scores and improved parental evaluations of school quality.
Moreover, Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Klein believed that large high schools
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can be inefficient and started replacing low-performing, large high schools with smaller
ones. Between 2003 and 2013, NYC replaced 63 pre-existing high schools with 337
small new high schools (Robbins and Meyer, 2013). To minimize disruption in stu-
dent learning, the city to the effort to gradually phase out the pre-existing schools
and build up the new schools. Bloom and Unterman (2012) and Unterman (2014)
used randomized assignment of students to 108 new, small high schools with excess
demand to estimate the effect of attending these schools. They found that attendees
experienced a 9.4 percentage points higher on-time graduation rates and are 8.4 per-
centage more likely to attend a postsecondary education program. Abdulkadiroğlu,
Hu, and Pathak (2013) used the same technique and identified positive effects on test
scores, credit accumulation, student engagement, and teacher feedback. However,
Hemphill et al. (2009) reported declining attendance and graduation rates over time
as well as high teacher turnover rates in these small high schools, and these schools
may have diverted more low-achieving students to existing large high schools.
These results are overall encouraging but caution is required before generalizing
that small high schools are effective and should replace all large high schools. First,
these 108 new, small high schools in the analyses are a subset of all 337 small new high
schools, and they faced excess demand from students. This suggests that these 108
schools may be higher quality, and students attending other small new high schools
might not experience the same benefit. Also, Bloom, Thompson, and Unterman
(2010) noted that these small schools are authorized through a competitive proposal
process and received assistance and policy protections from the district. Therefore,
if the number of small high schools scales up, the additional schools may be lower
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quality. Finally, Schwartz, Stiefel, and Wiswall (2013) used school proximity as an
instrumental variable strategy and showed that attending new small high schools,
rather than the old ones, present positive effects on students, and suggest that being
new, instead of being small, may be a more important factor for the success of the
new, small high schools.
In addition to the new high schools, charter schools had mushroomed during the
Bloomberg administration, and the number grew from 14 in 2001 to 183 in 2013. The
mayor’s advocate for charter schools is consistent with the philosophy behind Children
First: giving schools greater autonomy, increasing school choice, and intensifying
competition among schools. Hoxby, Murarka, and Kang (2009) used the lottery-
based admission policy in NYC charter schools, and find that lottery winners showed
substantial improvement in their academic performance, which might be due to a
longer school year in these schools. The caution for the small new high schools also
applies to this case: scaling up charter schools faces many challenges (Garcia, 2010)
and might be subject to diminishing returns to scale.
To provide students and their parents with more choices in high schools, the city
eliminated school zones and allowed them to actively make high school choices and
to take the exam for the city’s most selective high schools. Nevertheless, Hemphill
et al. (2009) suggested that A challenge in this choice system is that many students,
especially those require special education and foreign language assistance, and their
parents found it difficult to navigate the choice process, and school counselors were
overwhelmed by the complicated and burdensome application process. In addition,
Nathanson, Corcoran, and Baker-Smith (2013) found that low-achieving students
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were matched to, on average, lower-performing schools, partially because students
tend to favor geography, eligibility constraint, and personal preference instead of
school quality. Also, the school choice program failed to close the gaps between
low-achieving students and their higher-achieving peers.
Another key policy is not as related to school restructuring but significantly
changed the organization of student body and student incentives. The policy elimi-
nated social promotion and imposed academic standards for students to be promoted
to the next grade. As result, students who failed the test may repeat a grade with
the next cohort and have another year to comprehend the knowledge required to be
promoted. Geng and Rockoff (2016) showed that repeating a grade improved parental
satisfaction of school quality and students’ perceived safety in school; Geng (2018)
found evidence that the policy may induce an incentive effects on students to study
harder and avoid failing the test.
NYC has made sizable progress in restructuring schools but faced significant chal-
lenges in deepening these policies mainly due to the massive size of the district and
the large number of disadvantaged and minority students there. Small new high
schools and charter schools in NYC did show positive benefits to students, but scal-
ing up these programs while maintaining the same quality would require prohibitive
financial resources and supply of high-quality education talent. These two features
also compromised the intended effects of the school choice program on more equitable
access to high-achieving schools.
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Remaking School Budget
Establishing new schools, providing professional development, and many other pro-
grams in Children First are resource-consuming and required more funding. NYC’s
strong economic recovery since 2001 and efforts in attracting private philanthropy
provided strong support to these program. In addition, the city changed the school
financing scheme to better accommodate schools serving in-need and disadvantaged
students.
During 2002 and 2008, NYC experienced an annual increase of 10% (on average)
in the city fund and tax revenues (DiNapoli, 2015). In 2007, NYC received additional
funding through Contract for Excellence from New York State, which was phased-in
over time. Stiefel and Schwartz (2011) showed that per-pupil revenue in the city grew
dramatically during this period, from $13,290 in 2002 to $19,075 in 2008, making the
city the second highest per-pupil spending school district among the largest 100 public
school districts in the United States. They also found that this change reflected an
increased number of special education students as well as higher teacher salaries and
benefits.
In addition, Mayor Bloomberg and former Chancellor Klein made considerable
efforts to attract private philanthropy as a means to support new initiatives. Between
2003 and 2009, they raised $255 million through the Fund for NYC Public Schools
(ibid.), which were used to support the small new high schools, professional training,
and other programs through intermediary organizations. However, total private funds
only comprised of 1.3% of education expenditure in NYC, and was too small to have
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a large influence on total spending.
In 2007, the city implemented Fair Student Funding, changing the school financing
scheme. The old formula was largely based on teacher salaries. Because more expe-
rienced (expensive) teachers tend to work in higher-achieving schools, low-achieving
schools ended up with less spending per student. The new formula depend on student
characteristics and favored disadvantaged and in-need students. Therefore, schools
serving students were able to receive additional funding from this scheme, and funding
between low- and high-achieving schools became more equitable. The new formula
was planned to phase in across years: the ”winning” schools initially only received
part of the additional funding while the ”losing” schools were guaranteed the origi-
nal funding for a few years (hold-harmless provision). Dinerstein and Smith (2014)
found a 0.039 standard deviation increase in schools’ value-added for math but not
for English for every $1,000 increase in projected per-student funding.
However, the 2008 Great Recession brought the growth in funding to a halt. Both
the state and the city underwent a sharp reduction in their budget and had to cap or
even cut some of the education funding. As a result, per-pupil revenue grew by only
2% between 2009 and 2012, which was mainly driven by increasing pension payments
to teachers (New York City Independent Budget Office, 2011). The freeze in school
funding and the hold-harmless provision together resulted in that 94 percent of NYC
schools were receiving too little money based on student need (Subramanian, 2013).
To sum up, more education funding became available due to the city’s budget
surpluses, philanthropy, and additional state aid. Fair Student Funding also made
school funding more equitable. Nevertheless, the financial crisis in 2008 disrupted the
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full phase-in of the state aid and new city funding formula, and in-need schools still
fell short of funding until the next mayor took office.
Reforming School Workforce
Better trained principals and teacher may provide higher-quality education to stu-
dents and facilitate the school restructuring process. Mayor Bloomberg and Chancel-
lor Klein redesigned the personnel policies to provide high quality professional devel-
opment opportunities, open the market for hiring and transferring teachers, increase
teacher salaries, and impose rigorous evaluation systems on teachers and principals.
The core training program for principals was the NYC Leadership Academy, which
trained new principals in business-style management and prepare them to support
the low-performing schools under the reforms of Children First (O’Day and Bitter,
2010). Its flagship Aspiring Principals Program (APP) aimed at training new prin-
cipals to work in lower-performing elementary and middle schools. Clark, Martorell,
and Rockoff (2009) and Corcoran, Schwartz, and Weinstein (2012) found suggestive
evidence that principals trained through APP had a positive impact on students’ test
scores over time.
The city also launched Leaders in Education Apprenticeship Program to identify
eligible teachers and prepare them to transition into a principal position. In addition,
the city participated in New Leaders, a national program to develop school leaders,
and Principal Pipeline Initiative. Despite the tremendous effect in coaching new
principals, the city still fell behind in filling the principal vacancies (Turnbull et al.,
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2013). This shortage reflects an earlier comment in this paper: the scale of NYC
school district is too large to fully satisfy its demand for resources.
On the teacher side, NYC scaled up NYC Teaching Fellow and recruited more
teachers from Teach for America, both of which are highly selective programs. On
the one hand, Boyd et al. (2008) find that the gap between the qualifications of New
York City teachers in high-poverty schools and low-poverty schools has narrowed sub-
stantially since 2000. On the other hand, Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008) showed
that teachers from these two programs were not associated with greater teacher ef-
fectiveness, casting doubts on using these certification as a means to select teachers.
Three teacher residency programs were also launched to prepare teachers to teach
certain in-need student groups, such as English Language Learners.
The city also streamlined the hiring and transferring process of teachers, and
gave principals greater autonomy in teacher hiring. Under the new policy, the hiring
process starts earlier in the year and help minimize delays in placing new teachers.
Also, veteran teachers no longer have priorities in the hiring and transferring process,
and principals are able to hire based on merit instead of seniority.
To win support from United Federation of Teachers (UFT) for these changes,
Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Klein implemented across-the-board raises in teach-
ers’ salaries with other financial incentives. For example, NYC’s starting teacher
salaries increased 13 percent from 2000 to 2008, and eligible veteran teachers may
also become Lead Teachers to coach other teacher colleagues and receive $10,000 of
additional pay (Goertz, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2011). The city and UFT also piloted
a teacher incentive program in over 200 high-need schools, but evidence shows no
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effects from this program (Fryer Jr, 2013; Marsh et al., 2011).
Principals and teachers were also subject to more stringent evaluation on student
performance. Principals faced possible removal of their position if their schools re-
ceived poor ratings from the Progress Report and Quality Review. It was much more
difficult to implement an evaluation system for teachers. In 2013, with the interven-
tion of the New York State, the city and the union came into agreement on imposing
a teacher evaluation metric, which was partially based on students’ improvements in
test scores (Medina, 2010).
NYC clearly made great efforts in training, hiring, evaluating, and providing
incentives to teachers and principals. The evidence on the effects of these program
was largely suggestive and shows at best weakly positive. These results demonstrate
substantial difficulty in effective recruitment and development of education workforce.
Also, the city faced strong resistance from the teacher union and part of the additional
funding was used to resolve this conflict.
3.4 Reassessment of Children First
In this section, I first show that how NYC improved several important inputs to
improve student learning, then present the change in student performance over this
period, and lastly use the synthetic control method to estimate the overall impact of
Children First on student performance.
Figure 3.1 presents the improvement in several inputs over the period of Children
First. Panel A shows that since 2002, much more teachers who scored in the top-
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third of state-wide SAT scores have entered NYC education workforce (Lankford et
al., 2014), improving the NYC teachers’ quality during this period. Consistent with
Stiefel and Schwartz (2011), Panel B shows constant growth in per-pupil spending
from 2002 to 2008 (when the financial crisis took place), and stagnated until 2012.
Still, this growth significantly improved the funding to students. Corresponding the
Panel B, class sizes in Panel C steadily decreased from 2002 to 2009, but bounced
back rapidly ever since. Panel D shows that the number of charter schools increased
dramatically since 2004 and quadrupled during this period. Clearly, the amount
and quality of education inputs increased under Children First, although the 2008
financial crisis led to a halt in further improvement in funding and class sizes.
I use 4th and 8th test scores from the public data site in New York State Education
to measure student performance. The data contain basic information of all school
districts in the New York state from 1999 to 2012. Test scores are standardized at the
year-grade-subject level to have zero mean and unit standard deviation.1 I also rely
on the report from NYCDOE (2015) to present the trend of high school graduation
rates, but exclude them from the impact analysis because it is subject to manipulation
(Burke, Chapman, and Monahan, 2013; Office of the State Comptroller, 2014).
Figure 3.2 shows the average test scores in 4th and 8th grade between 1999 and
2012. Panel A and B present the math and English test scores in 4th grade, and
they had been increasing greatly over this period (from the bottom in the state to
be around the average). However, the growth occurred before 2002, so the continual
growth could be a result of this pre-reform trend. Panel C and D show the math and
1Average test scores are unavailable for 2005.
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English test scores in 8th grade. The math scores increased steadily while the English
scores had been flat. Figure 3.3 shows that various measures of high school graduation
rates also went up during this period. Overall speaking, student performance had
been improving when Children First was in place, but these figures cannot tell if
these improvements are due to Children First.
Evaluating the impact of Children First is difficult. Besides potential confounding
factors, choosing a reasonable comparison group is also challenging because NYC is
quite different in several aspects. Table 3.2 presents the average of student charac-
teristics and performance between NYC and other counties in the New York state.
Students in NYC are much more likely to be free lunch recipient, special education
recipient, minority, and low-achieving.
To account for this large difference, I adopt the synthetic control method in the
hope of finding some counties or their linear combinations in the New York state that
resemble NYC before Children First was implemented. I consider NYC as a single
school district and other counties in the New York state as potential control groups
in the donor pool. The matching covariates are average test score, percentage of
students receiving free lunch, percentage of special education students, and percentage
of African American, Hispanic, Asian, and White students before Children First was
implemented in 2003.2 Inference is based on assigning a treatment status to each
member of the donor pool and comparing the treatment effects on the actual treated
group with the placebo treatment effects on the members of the donor pool.
2The matching algorithm uses a Stata package developed by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller
(2014), which minimizes the pre-treatment mean square prediction error (MSPE).
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Figure 3.4 presents the graphical evidence on the impact of Children First on
students’ Math and English test scores in 4th and 8th grade. The red dots plot the
difference between the treatment group and the synthetic control group in each year;
the gray lines plot the difference between each member in the donor pool and its
synthetic control group in each year. The horizontal line is at zero; the vertical line
indicates when Children First was implemented.
Panel A and B show the result on test scores in 4th grade. Before Children First
was implemented in 2003, the matching between NYC and the synthetic control group
is poor, indicating a lack of counties comparable to NYC. After Children First was
implemented, the math scores experienced a sizable jump and continued to increase
ever since, but English scores seem to stagnate. Panel C and D show the result on
test scores in 8th grade. The matching works better in this case but still is not ideal.
We may also observe an improvement in 8th-grade math scores but not English scores
after Children First. The placebo tests show a better matching within the donor pool
but not with NYC. A rough comparison between the placebo effects and the real
effect seems to suggest that the effects on math scores are significant from zero.
One caveat of this analysis is that the matching covariates may not be sufficient for
controlling certain variables that may drive changes in NYC after 2002. A compelling
factor is that NYC experienced a stronger recovery after 2001, which might contribute
to a higher growth of student performance in NYC and overstate the impact of
Children First.
To conclude, I use a synthetic control method to estimate the impact of Children
First on students’ 4th-grade and 8th-grade test scores. There appears to be large
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improvements in students’ math test scores in 4th and 8th grades, but not in their
English test scores. However, poor matching of the synthetic control method and
some potential confounding factors limit the validity of these results.
3.5 An Economic Analysis of Children First
In this section, I provide an economic analysis to understand the impact of various
policies on student learning through providing incentives and autonomy, improving
inputs in education production, and potential complementarity among these factors.
I also discuss challenges and obstacles facing this reform, which may counteract its
effectiveness.
Incentives and Autonomy
According to Dixit (2002), public education is characterized as “a multi-task multi-
principal nearly-monopoly organization with vague and poorly observable goals”.
NYC school district was clearly in this category: schools’ enrollment was guaran-
teed with school zones, there were no consequences for failing to improve students’
test scores, multiple stakeholders were responsible for decision-making in school op-
eration. In this case, the goal of education was unclear, no one was fully accountable
for improving schools, and no incentives were provided to do so. Efforts were weak
and diversified into multiple goals; free-riding among different agents was likely.
The autonomy for accountability policy under Children First clearly changed this
situation. The goal became clearer – improving students’ test scores; principals be-
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came solely responsible for achieving this goal; and the consequences were severe if
the principals failed to achieve the goal. Therefore, principals would shoulder most
of the responsibilities and respond to the punishment by increasing and concentrat-
ing efforts in improving students’ test scores. Decentralization of management and
greater autonomy would also provide principals with more flexibility in allocating re-
sources, managing staff, and adjusting school operation, which may complement the
accountability policy.3 Bloom et al. (2015) also note that school autonomy, account-
ability, and leadership (three aspects emphasized in Children First) are associated
with higher management scores and better educational outcomes.
When principals were given greater autonomy, their managerial skills became
more important in affecting school performance, and differences in principals’ quality
may widen the performance between schools. Rice (2010) reported that principals’
effectiveness does vary from one to another, and more importantly, principals pos-
sessing characteristics that are associated with higher effectiveness are less likely to
work in high-poverty and low-achieving schools. This pattern raises the concern that
greater autonomy might result in a widening gap in student performance between
low- and high-achieving schools. The various professional development programs un-
der Children First may alleviate this concern, which will be discussed in the next
section.
Children First also increased competition across schools and further strength-
ened schools’ incentives to improve student performance. The threat of closing low-
3Hong, Kueng, and Yang (2016) suggests a similar idea by showing a complementarity between
performance pay and decentralized decision-making for a sample of Canadian firms.
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performing schools, opening up new and charter schools, and providing a wide range
of choices essentially eliminated the monopoly of zoned schools and magnified the
punishment for poorly-performing schools. The real effect might be attenuated, since
schools’ academic performance is usually not students’ and parents’ foremost con-
cern (Hastings, Kane, and Staiger, 2006; Hastings and Weinstein, 2008; Nathanson,
Corcoran, and Baker-Smith, 2013).
Because public education is multi-task, accountability based on math and English
may improve schools’ effort on these two subjects but harm students’ test scores in
other subjects and development of non-cognitive skills.4 One solution is to incorpo-
rate these measures into the accountability system as well, but West (2016) pointed
out that measuring non-cognitive skills is mainly based on self-reported surveys and
subject to manipulation, an issue yet to be addressed to be included in any account-
ability system. Also, improvements in math and English test scores do translate into
better adulthood outcomes (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff, 2014b), which relieves
the concern of over-emphasis of these tests.
To sum up, an important piece of Children First made principals the main stake-
holder and provided them with incentives to improve students’ test scores. Coupled
with greater autonomy in school management, the principals were expected to exert
greater effort and adjust management to focus on students’ test scores. Although
there are concerns about teaching to the test, focusing on math and English test
scores seems to be the optimal goal under various constraints.
4For example, West et al., 2016 found that attending charter schools improve students’ academic
performance but harm their conscientiousness, self-control, and grit.
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Inputs and Complementarity
The supporting policies under Children First focused on providing and improving
several key inputs in education production. More importantly, these inputs may
possibly complement the autonomy for accountability policy as well as one another,
magnifying the overall impact of Children First.
A key component of Children First was to increase the overall education expendi-
ture for students, especially those requiring additional education support. Although
it is impossible to directly assess the impact of this additional funding on NYC educa-
tion outcomes, research has shown that increasing education spending has a positive
impact on student achievement and closing achievement gaps (Jackson, Johnson, and
Persico, 2015; Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach, 2016). This additional fund-
ing loosed the financial constraint for schools and allowed them to have the resources
to, for example, provide better facilities to teachers and more remedial programs to
students, which might complement the autonomy for accountability policy.5
Principal and teacher quality also constitutes an important part of education pro-
duction, and several programs in Children First focused on recruiting more effective
principal and teachers as well as improving the existing ones. Numerous studies have
shown the importance of more effective principals (Clark, Martorell, and Rockoff,
2009; Day, Gu, and Sammons, 2016; Dhuey and Smith, 2014; Rice, 2010) and more
effective teachers (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff, 2014a,b; Rivkin, Hanushek, and
Kain, 2005). In addition, greater autonomy also enabled more effective principals
5The complementarity between education spending and school accountability makes intuitive
sense but there lack evidence of it.
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and teachers to better utilize their resources, adjust managerial strategy, and choose
optimal instructional models. In other words, there can be complementarity between
the autonomy for accountability policy and improvements in teacher/principal qual-
ity. Certainly, an open question is whether the programs in Children First improved
the quality of teachers and principals in NYC, and the existing evidence provided
only suggestive evidence of the effectiveness of these programs.
These supporting programs clearly targeted a few essential inputs in education
production and have the potential of improving education quality in NYC. Moreover,
these programs may complement the autonomy for accountability policy, further im-
proving the overall effectiveness of Children First. However, the empirical results of
these programs and their complementarity are largely unknown and worth of future
research.
Challenges and Obstacles
The previous analyses have shown that the overall design of Children First and various
policies targeted at the right areas and pointed at the right direction. However, the
sheer size, diversity, and unions in NYC posed great challenges to Children First.
First, NYC school district is massive, and it requires an enormous amount of
resources to improve it. School spending is certainly a key component, and NYC
made substantial progress prior to the 2008 financial crisis. A more challenging re-
source is the workforce. Establishing new schools required more principals, teachers,
and administrative staff. However, the short-run supply of these education workers
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is inelastic, and thus expanding the demand for them would result in excessive de-
mand, raising price (impossible due to union contracts), and decreased quality. This
constraint limited the scale of Children First and might have resulted in resource com-
petitions among schools, leading to redistribution instead of improvement in overall
student performance in the city. One solution is provide students with more access
to high-quality education through online learning and virtual schools (Barbour and
Reeves, 2009).
Second, New York City enrolls a socioeconomically and racially diverse student
population. As a result, one size can hardly fit all. For example, Herrmann (2011)
showed that curriculum standardization in NYC did not produce positive effects
on student performance. Also, the school choice system also imposed challenges to
disadvantaged students and counselors in schools serving these students (Hemphill
et al., 2009). A more tailored system may be more effective. Some other policies in
Children First have done a better job at tailoring to different schools and students.
For example, Fair Student Funding assigned more weight to in-need students in the
funding formula; Progress Report mainly compares schools serving students of similar
demographics and need.
Third, administrators’ union and teacher union imposed substantial resistance to
Children First, particularly with respect to workforce renumeration, recruiting, and
evaluation. The support from principals and teachers came with 23 percent increase
in principals’ base pay (Herszenhorn, 2007) and 13 percent increase in entry-level
teachers’ base pay (Goertz, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2011) as well as performance-based
bonus payment. This means much of the education expenditure was used to cover
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higher salaries for existing education workers, which has no direct benefits to the
students in the short run. Also, since teachers and principals are rarely fired after
they are tenured (Algar, 2016; Edelman, 2013), the incentives for them to exert
greater effort into improving student performance are weak.
3.6 Conclusion
Mayor Bloomberg’s Children First gave rise to many radical changes to school man-
agement, principals’ incentives, school funding, and workforce development in New
York city. To better understand this large-scale education reform in NYC, I first
outline the key components of Children First and summarize important studies on
its overall effectiveness. However, the evidence is suggestive, and the estimates are
mixed.
Since Children First is a collection of many policy changes, understanding these
policies is essential for understanding Children First. I examine these policies through
reviewing key studies on the effectiveness of them. I found that these studies tend to
demonstrate positive effects, which suggests a positive impact of Children First.
Adopting the synthetic control method by comparing NYC and other counties
in the New York state shows that Children First may have large positive effects on
math but not on English test scores. These results are consistent with the results
in Chapter 1, in which the complementarity exhibits a large improvement in math
scores rather than in English scores. Nevertheless, NYC is quite different from other
counties, and the pre-treatment matching does not look ideal. Therefore, these results
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should be considered with great caution.
Through an economic analysis, I show that the autonomy for accountability pol-
icy, additional financial resources, and human capital development may have bene-
fited student learning, but resource constraints, diversity of student composition, and
resistance from the unions may have limited the effectiveness of Children First.
The analysis of Children First provides several suggestions to policy-makers in
pubic education. These results show that certain educational policies are effective,
especially when they are able to address key issues in public education (Dixit, 2002).
Also, education reforms similar to Children First might be more successful in school
districts where the district size is smaller, the student composition is homogeneous,
unions are not as powerful, and the resource constraint is not as tight. However, each
school district is different, and policy-makers need to carefully consider local students’




Figure 3.1: Trend of Several Key Educational Inputs
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Notes: Panel A plots the percentage of entering teachers in NYC drawn from bottom, middle, and
top thirds of state-wide score distribution (on national SATs) (Lankford et al., 2014). Panel B
plots the average student spending from the school-based expenditure reports (NYCDOE, 2016).
Panel C plots the average class size in 4th grade from the Class Size Report (NYCDOE, 2017b).
Panel D plots the number of charter schools each year in NYC (The New York City Charter
School Center, 2012).
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Figure 3.2: Trend of NYC Student Test Scores










1999 2002 2005 2008 2010 2012
Year









1999 2002 2005 2008 2010 2012
Year










1999 2002 2005 2008 2010 2012
Year









1999 2002 2005 2008 2010 2012
Year
Notes: All panels are based on data from 1999 to 2012. The red dots plot the raw data of NYC
student outcomes in each year. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are math and English
test scores in 4th grade; the dependent variables in Panels C and D are math and English test
scores in 8th grade. To the right of the black line are years after Children First was implemented.
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Figure 3.3: Trend of NYC Student High School Graduation Rate
Notes: Figure plots the graduation rates by various standards in each year (NYCDOE, 2015).
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Figure 3.4: Overall Impact of Children First
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Notes: All panels are based on data from 1999 to 2012. The red dots plot the difference between
the treatment group and the synthetic control group in each year; the gray lines plot the difference
between each member in the donor pool and its synthetic control group in each year. The
dependent variables in Panels A and B are math and English test scores in 4th grade; the
dependent variables in Panels C and D are math and English test scores in 8th grade. The




Table 3.1: Chronology of Major Policies under Children First
Year Major Policies
2002 Mayor Bloomberg took office and gained control of NYC’s schoolsSmall high school movement and charter school expansion initiated
2003
10 administrative regions replaced 32 community school districts
Math and reading curricula were standardized
The NYC Leadership Academy to train and support school leaders
2004
Autonomy Zone as a pilot program of the accountability for autonomy policy
A universal high school choice process
Grade retention policy holds back students who fall behind academically
2006 Quality Review to provide schools with qualitative evaluation
2007 School Accountability Scheme to evaluate schools based on student performanceFair Student Funding to allocate more funding based on student needs
2013 Teacher ratings tied with student growth on state tests
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
New York City Other Counties in NY State
Percent of Free Lunch Recipient 66.23 25.24
Percent of Special Education Students 14.85 1.458
Percent of African American Students 32.42 5.979
Percent of Hispanic Students 39.19 4.355
Percent of Asian Students 13.50 1.757
Percent of White Students 14.88 87.94
Average Math Score -1.744 0.0306
Average ELA Score -2.113 0.0371
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I apply a simple framework to describe the mechanism of a student’s response to
additional teacher effort into testing in order to understand the effects found in the
empirical analysis. The framework focuses on a student’s maximization problem and
abstracts away from the joint determination of teacher input and student effort, which
is discussed by Todd and Wolpin (2012). The framework shows that the interactive
effects arise from two sources: the change in the pattern of the student’s behavioral
response due to greater student incentives, and additional marginal returns to student
effort due to teacher effort.
Setup
Consider a student in a classroom with a teacher, where their joint effort affects the
student’s test scores. The education production involves two aspects: the technology
of producing test scores and the costs associated with student effort, both of which




[αA− C(s, t)] (1)
where A is the student’s test score and is defined as A = F (s, t), in which F (s, t)
represents the technology of producing test scores, and the first-order partial dif-
ferentials, Fs(s, t) and Ft(s, t), are assumed to be both positive, indicating positive
returns to student effort and teacher effort in terms of test scores; s and t are student
effort and teacher effort, respectively; α > 0 measures the student’s preference for
test scores; and C(s, t) indicates the student’s costs of exerting effort and is assumed
to be positive. Fss(s, t) < 0 is assumed to capture diminishing marginal returns to
student effort; Css(s, t) = 0 is assumed for simplicity.
Teacher effort is determined exogenously and assumed to be equal to the strength
of teacher incentives. Mathematically, t = β, where β measures teacher incentives.
When neither policies is in effect, the baseline parameters are denoted as α0 and
β0. Given the assumptions, the solution to this problem is equivalent to solving the
first-order condition, αFs(s, β)− Cs(s, β) = 0.
132
The Retention Policy
When the retention policy is in place, student incentives increase from α0 to α1, and
A can be shown to increase with α. The change in a student’s test score is described
by ∆A(∆α, β0) = F (s(α1, β0), β0) − F (s(α0, β0), β0), in which ∆α = α1 − α0. A
first-order Taylor approximation shows that the change in the test score is roughly:
∆A(∆α, β0) ≈ Fs(s(α0, β0), β0) ds
dα
∆α (2)
When ∆α > 0, the sign of ∆A is equivalent to the sign of Fs(s(α0, β0), β0)ds/dα.
Fs(s(α0, β0), β0) is assumed to be positive, and ds/dα can be shown as −fs/(αfss),
which is also positive based on the assumptions. As a result, when student incentives
increase, the student exerts more effort, and his or her test score increases.
The Accountability Scheme
When a teacher directs additional effort to the student after the implementation of
the accountability scheme, the change in the test score is more complicated. When β0
increases to β1, ∆A(α0,∆β) = F (s(α0, β1), β1)−F (s(α0, β0), β0), where∆β = β1−β0.
This change is approximated as:










The direct effect is clearly positive, since the assumptions state that
Ft(s(α0, β0), β0) > 0, and dt/dβ = 1 > 0. The sign of the behavioral response is
determined by ds/dβ, which is not necessarily positive. ds/dβ can be shown as:
ds
dβ
= −αFst − Cst
αFss
(4)
In this equation, since Fss is assumed to be negative, the sign is determined by
the relative magnitude of αFst and Cst. These two factors may represent the two
counteracting effects described in the section on a possible mechanism. Fst(s, t) is
assumed to be positive and captures the first effect — that is, teacher effort increases
the return to student effort in terms of test scores. Cst(s, t) is also assumed to be
positive and represents the effect whereby additional teacher effort on increase student
laziness and resistance.
When student incentives are low, Cst dominates, and the student exhibits a neg-
ative behavioral response. A small α results in a relatively larger Cst, and therefore
αFst − Cst < 0, leading to ds/dβ < 0. Therefore, the student reduces the amount
of effort. If the reduction of student effort is large enough, the change in his or her




The interactive effects identified in the empirical analysis are equivalent to subtracting
the individual effect of each policy from the combined effects of the two policies.
In other words, the interactive effects are defined as ∆A(∆α,∆β) − ∆A(α0,∆β) −
∆A(∆α, β0). The combined effects, ∆A(∆α,∆β), are approximately:
∆A(∆α,∆β) ≈ Fs(s(α0, β0), β0) ds
dα
∆α︸ ︷︷ ︸










Behavioral Response to ∆β
(5)
In this equation, the direct effect from ∆β is equal to the direct effect of the account-
ability scheme, ∆A(α0,∆β).
As a result, the interactive effects arise from the change in ds/dα with respect to








Since the assumptions have determined the signs of Fs, Fst, and Fss, the sign of Fsst
needs to be assumed in order to determine the sign of ∂(ds/dα)
∂β
. Since additional teacher
effort should not make the marginal returns to student effort diminish faster, Fsst is
expected to be weakly positive. All these assumptions indicate that ∂(ds/dα)
∂β
> 0,
which means that the growth in student effort with respect to α increases with β.






× −Fss(Fsts − Csst/α + Cst/α
2)− Fsss(Fst − Cst/α)
(Fss)2
(7)
The assumption Css = 0 and other assumptions on the sign of other factors indicate
that −Fss(Fsts−Csst/α+Cst/α2) = −Fss(Fsts+Cst/α2) > 0. The sign of Fsss is more
difficult to determine.6 If Fsss is negative and large, Fss decreases quickly with respect
to s, and student incentives are expected to have a small overall impact, which is not
supported by the effects of the retention policy found in the empirical analysis. The
negative effects of the accountability scheme suggest Fst − Cst/α < 0; ∂s∂α has been
shown to be positive. As a result, ∂(ds/dβ)
∂α
> 0.
In short, the interactive effects arise from two sources: the increase in student
effort due to additional teacher effort and the reduction in the student’s negative
behavioral response due to greater student incentives.
6If F (s, t) follows a Cobb-Douglas form, Fsss > 0.
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Probability of Retention
Figure 1.2 suggests that students’ probability of retention may have changed after
2007, the year when the accountability scheme was implemented. Since retained
students do not count toward the student progress scores in the accountability scheme,
this change may be due to the accountability scheme.
It is challenging to causally estimate the interactive effect on the probability of
retention, since there lacks a control group within each grade for students subject to
the retention policy. Many factors may have resulted in a change in retention patterns.
For example, teachers and principals may have promoted students who failed the test
but could be counted favorably in the accountability scheme if promoted. Changes
in retention patterns could also be due to changes in students’ academic portfolios or
behaviors.
Appendix Figure A20 examines change in retention patterns after the account-
ability scheme was implemented. Panels A and B show that, during the two years
between the retention policy and the accountability scheme, the grade subject to the
retention policy imposed a greater probability of retention, especially for students
who failed the test.7 Panels C and D show the probability of retention after the
accountability scheme was implemented. Retention risks conditional on failing math
tests increased for grades not subject to the retention policy, which may due to more
selective retention decisions on these grades. Retention risks conditional on failing
English tests decreased for the grade subject to the policy. Examining the summer
school outcomes suggests that this decrease may be due to higher August English
test scores.
7There is a jump two points to the right of the black line. The jump is due to adoption of the
state tests and redefinition of the cutoff in 2006.
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Survey Questions in Each Category
• Parents’ overall satisfaction includes questions 2, 5, 9 and 13.
• Parents’ sense of overall safety includes question 11.
• Students’ overall satisfaction includes questions 2a, 3e, 3f, 3g, 6a, 6c-6g, 14a
• Students’ sense of personal safety includes 13a, 13e, 13f, 13g
• Students’ perception of environment includes 3d, 6b, 12a, 12b, 12c, 13b, 13c,
13d, 14b-14f.
136
Continuity of Personal Characteristics
In order to validate our Regression Discontinuity Design, we test continuity of char-
acteristics other than percent of women, percent of reduce/free-price lunch recipients,
and density of observations (shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4). Appendix Figure A27
shows that the percentage of each ethnicity is continuous across the cutoff. Appendix
Figure A28 presents the percentage of students who stay at NYC public schools next
year at each index and there is no discontinuity at the cutoff. Appendix Figure A29
shows the percentage of students and parents who responded to surveys by index
score and both rates are smooth through the cutoff. We also test continuity by re-
gression analysis. These results are in Appendix Table A18. This supports the notion

























































Notes: Both panels are restricted to the years prior to the accountability scheme (prior to 2007)
and to students exempt from the retention policy. Each point represents the probability of being
retained at each value of the index. The index is defined as the difference between a student’s
spring test score and the cutoff in each subject. Students on the left of the gray vertical line failed
the test. Pre-Ret combines the grades/years not subject to the retention policy, and Post-Ret
combines the grades/years subject to the retention policy.
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Grade 5 Grade 4 and 6 (Combined)
Notes: Both panels focus on students exempt from the retention policy. Each point restricts the
observations to the students in Figure 1.1 and represents the probability of retention conditional
on failing the test in each subject-grade-year cell — that is,
Prob(Retention|Fail)− Prob(Retention|Pass). Blue triangles present the probability of retention
for 5th grade;Gray squares present the probability of retention for 4th and 6th grades. To the right
of the black line are years after the retention policy was implemented.
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Figure A3: The Accountability Grade Rubric
Final Calculation of Progress Report Grade 
 
Category Scores are calculated by weighting the values within each 
category of the Proximity to Peer Horizon (x3) and Proximity to Peer 
Horizon (x1) measures for School Environment, Student 
Performance, and Student Progress.  As the weighting indicates, 
Proximity to Peer Horizon counts three times as much as Proximity to 
City Horizon. These weighted values within each category are then 
averaged to create scores for School Environment, Student 
Performance, and Student Progress. The school’s overall score is a 
weighted average of School Environment (15%), Student 
Performance (25%), and Student Progress (60%) plus any additional 
credit earned by the school. 
 
The maximum point values for each measure are indicated in the 
table below: 
 










School Environment 15.0 11.25 3.75 
Academic Expectations 2.5 1.875 0.625 
Communication 2.5 1.875 0.625 
Engagement 2.5 1.875 0.625 
Safety and Respect 2.5 1.875 0.625 
Attendance 5.0 3.75 1.25 
Student Performance 25.0 18.75 6.25 
ELA – Percentage of 
Students at Proficiency 6.25 4.6875 1.5625 
ELA – Median Student 
Proficiency 6.25 4.6875 1.5625 
Math – Percentage of 
Students at Proficiency 6.25 4.6875 1.5625 
Math – Median Student 
Proficiency 6.25 4.6875 1.5625 
 










Student Progress 60.0 45.0 15.0 
ELA – Percentage of 
Students Making at 
Least 1 Year of 
Progress 
7.5 5.625 1.875 
ELA – Percentage of 
Students in School’s 
Lowest Third Making at 
Least 1 Year of 
Progress 
7.5 5.625 1.875 
ELA – Average Change 
in Student Proficiency 













specific) ELA – Average Change 
in Student Proficiency 
for Level 3 and Level 4 
students 
Math – Percentage of 
Students Making at 
Least 1 Year of 
Progress 
7.5 5.625 1.875 
Math – Percentage of 
Students in School’s 
Lowest Third Making at 
Least 1 Year of 
Progress 
7.5 5.625 1.875 
Math – Average 
Change in Student 
Proficiency for Level 1 
and Level 2 students 
15.0 
(school-specific 









specific) Math – Average 
Change in Student 
Proficiency for Level 3 
and Level 4 students 
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Notes: Panels A, B, C, and D plot the percentage of students who took the exam separately by
subject and exemption status for the retention policy. Panel E plots the percentage of exempt
students conditional on having both current and prior test scores.
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1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
English Scores
Lowest-third Top-two-thirds
Notes: Each panel plots the kernel density of test scores separately for lowest-third and
top-two-thirds students in each subject.
































1 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.6 3 3.4 3.8 4.2
Prior Test Score
Notes: Both panels are restricted to years when neither policies was implemented (prior to 2004)
and divide prior test scores into bins of 0.2 points each. Each point represents the average
probability of failing the test at each bin of prior test scores.
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Notes: All panels are based on data from 2002 to 2006 and use the grade subject to the retention
policy. This figure plots coefficients β2 for each year from an event-study version of Equation 1.1.
The dependent variables in Panels A and B are test scores in math and English. The dependent
variables in Panels C and D are the number of days absent from school and an indicator of ever
being suspended from school. To the right of the black line are years after the retention policy was
implemented.
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Notes: All panels are based on data from 2002 to 2006 and use grades not subject to the retention
policy. The red line plots the difference between the treatment group and the synthetic control
group in each year; the gray lines plot the difference between each member in the donor pool and
its synthetic control group in each year. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are test scores
in math and English; the dependent variables in Panels C and D are the number of days absent
from school and an indicator of ever being suspended from school. To the right of the black line
are years after the retention policy was implemented.
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1 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.6 3 3.4 3.8 4.2
Prior Test Score
Notes: Both panels are based on students in the grade subject to the retention policy between
2003 and 2005 and divide prior test scores into bins of 0.2 points each. Each point represents a
difference-in-difference estimate of the retention policy for each bin of students, using exempt
students as a control group. Above the horizontal line stands for improvements in the outcome. To
the right of the black line are students who faced little risk of failure.
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Notes: All panels are based on data from 2002 to 2006 and use the grade subject to the retention
policy. The red line plots the difference between the treatment group and the synthetic control
group in each year; the gray lines plot the difference between each member in the donor pool and
its synthetic control group in each year. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are teachers’
years of experience in math and English; the dependent variables in Panels C and D are teachers’
days of absence from school in each subject. To the right of the black line are years after the
retention policy was implemented.
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Notes: All panels are based on teacher data from 2002 to 2006 and use the grade subject to the
retention policy. This figure plots coefficients β2 for each year from an event-study version of
Equation 1.1. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are teachers’ years of experience in math
and English; the dependent variables in Panels C and D are teachers’ days of absence from school
in each subject. To the right of the black line are years after the retention policy was implemented.
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2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
Grade 4: Lowest-third Grade 4: Top-two-thirds
Grade 5: Lowest-third Grade 5: Top-two-thirds

















2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
Grade 4: Lowest-third Grade 4: Top-two-thirds
Grade 5: Lowest-third Grade 5: Top-two-thirds
Grade 6: Lowest-third Grade 6: Top-two-thirds
Notes: Both panels plot average prior outcomes in each year separately for lowest-third and
top-two-thirds students.
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Grade 6 45° Line
Notes: All panels are restricted to years when neither policies was in effect (prior to 2005).
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2003-2004 Diff 2005-2006 Diff
Post-Act Diff
Notes: All panels are based on data from 2003 to 2009 and focus on students subject to the
retention policy but in the grades not subject to the retention policy. This figure plots residuals
obtained from regressing the outcomes on Equation 1.3. The x-axis in the left column uses prior
math ranks; the x-axis in the right column uses prior English ranks. Triangles plot the means of
the residuals in the post-accountability era; the lighter dashed line plots the means of the residuals
in the years 2003 and 2004, and the darker and longer one plots those in the years 2005 and 2006.
The gray vertical line indicates the cutoff for being in the lowest third and the gray horizontal line
is at the value of zero. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are test scores in each subject;
the dependent variables in Panels C and D are days absent from school; the dependent variables in
Panels E and F are probability of suspension.
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2003 2005 2007 2009
Year
Notes: All panels are based on data from 2003 to 2009 and focus on students subject to the
retention policy but in the grades not subject to the retention policy. This figure plots coefficients
β2 for each year from an event-study version of Equation 1.3. Each point represents the average of
the residuals at each year. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are teachers’ years of
experience in math and English; the dependent variables in Panels C and D are teachers’ days of
absence from school in each subject. To the right of the black line are years after the
accountability scheme was implemented.
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2003 2005 2007 2009
Year
Notes: All panels are based on data from 2003 to 2009 and focus on special education/ELL
students in 4th and 6th grades. This figure plots coefficients β2 for each year from an event-study
version of Equation 1.2. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are test scores in each
subject; the dependent variables in Panels C and D are days absent from school; the dependent
variables in Panels E and F are probability of suspension. To the right of the black line are years
after the accountability scheme was implemented.
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State Test City Test
Notes: Both panels plot the percentage of free lunch recipients at each quantile immediately before
(2005) and after adopting the state tests (2006) in grades 4 and 6. The solid line stands for the
state tests (2006) and the dashed line stands for the city tests (2005).
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2003-2004 Diff 2005-2006 Diff
Post-Act Diff
Notes: All panels use data from 2003 to 2009, focus on students subject to the retention policy,
and plot the differences in the residuals obtained from regression 1.3 between the grade subject to
the retention policy and other grades. The x-axis in the left column uses prior math ranks; the
x-axis in the right column uses prior English ranks. The short dashed line plots the years 2003 and
2004, the black and longer dashed line plots the years 2005 and 2006, and triangles plot the
post-accountability years. The gray vertical line indicates the cutoff for being in the lowest third
and the gray horizontal line is at the value of zero. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are
test scores in each subject; the dependent variables in Panels C and D are days absent from school;
the dependent variables in Panels E and F are probability of suspension.
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2003 2005 2007 2009
Year
Notes: All panels use data from 2003 to 2009, focus on students subject to the retention policy,
and plot a time series of DID estimates that use the residuals generated from regression 1.3 to
measure the effect of being a lowest-third student in the grade subject to the retention policy. The
left panels focus on lowest-third students in math, and the right panels examine lowest-third
students in English. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are teachers’ years of experience
in math and English; the dependent variables in Panels C and D are teachers’ days of absence
from school in each subject. To the right of the black line are years after the accountability scheme
was implemented.
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Non-Ret Grades Ret Grade
Notes: All panels restrict the data as described in the Data section. Panels A and B are restricted
to the two years prior to the accountability scheme (2005 and 2006); Panels C and D are restricted
to the years after the accountability scheme was implemented (after 2007). Each point represents
the probability of being retained at each value of the index. The index is defined as the difference
between a student’s test score and the cutoff in each subject. Students to the left of the gray
vertical line failed the test. “Non-Ret Grades” combines grades not subject to the retention policy,
and “Ret Grade” stands for the grade subject to the retention policy.
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Figure A21: Frequency of Pre- and Post-Policy Retention Rates
Note: The retention rates are the discontinuity in the probability of being retained at the
cutoff. This figure plots the histogram of change in retention rate at the cutoff at each
grade-year cell.
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Figure A22: Effects on Future Test Scores and Special Education
(A) Mathematics (B) ELA
(C) Special Education
Note: These figures plot residuals from regressions of future test scores and probability of
receiving special education on fixed effects for test grade by test year. ELA stands for the
English Language Arts exam. Average residuals by index score are plotted separately by
students who were retained (yellow triangle), failed at least one of the tests but were not
retained (circle on the left side of cutoff), and passed both tests (circle on the right side of
cutoff). ELA stands for the English Language Arts exam.
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Figure A23: Placebo Effects on Survey Responses
(A) Parental Satisfaction (B) Parental Sense of Overall Safety
(C) Student Satisfaction (D) Student Safety
(E) Student Sense of Environment
Note: These figures plot residuals from regressions of current (i.e. prior to retention)
values of parental satisfaction, parental sense of overall safety, student satisfaction,
student safety, and student sense of environment on fixed effects for test grade by
test year.
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Figure A24: Placebo Effects on Survey Responses by Policies
(A) Pre-policy Parental Satisfaction (B) Post-policy Parental Satisfaction
(C) Pre-policy Student Safety (D) Post-policy Student Safety
Note: These figures plot residuals from regressions of current (i.e. prior to retention)
values of parental satisfaction, parental sense of overall safety, student satisfaction,
student safety, and student sense of environment on fixed effects for test grade by
test year. Plots are done separately by retention policy regime
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Figure A25: CIA Visual Test
(A) Parental Satisfaction
(B) Student Safety
Note: These figures plot residuals from regressions on pre-determined covariates by index
score for parental satisfaction and student safety. Comparing the LOWESS and the hori-
zontal line at each side of the cutoff only supports CIA with respect to parental satisfaction
outcome. Appendix Table A17 presents regression results and suggests the same conclusion.
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Figure A26: Distribution of Two-year Prior Mathematics Score
Note: The box plot summarizes the distribution of two-year prior normalized mathematics
scores at each index score.
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Figure A27: Continuity of Other Personal Characteristics
(A) Asian (B) Black
(C) Hispanic (D) Native
(E) White
Note: These figures plot average percent of Asian (Panel a), Black (Panel b), Hispanic
(Panel c), Native (Panel d) , and White (Panel e) students by index score.
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Figure A28: Continuity of Attrition Rate
Note: This figure plots average probability for appearing in the datasets next year at each
index score.
163
Figure A29: Continuity of Response Rates against Indexes
(A) Student Response Rate
(B) Parent Response Rate
Note: Each point represents the raw response rate at each index for parents and




Table A1: Effects of the Retention Policy on Teachers
Math English
Experience Absences Experience Absences
RetPol -0.21 0.33 -0.22 0.34
(0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29)
Observations 192,829 189,689 192,840 189,643
Notes: All regressions implement specification 1.1 and display the coefficient of RetPoligt, an
indicator of the retention policy. Standard errors are clustered at the school-year level in
parentheses.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Table A2: Effects of the Accountability Scheme on Teachers
Math English
Experience Absences Experience Absences
Low*Act -0.097 0.027 0.0078 0.037
(0.065) (0.070) (0.063) (0.070)
Observations 730,520 721,679 731,565 722,223
Notes: All regressions restrict observations to grades not subject to the retention policy and
implement specification 1.2. The coefficient of the interaction term Lowist′ ∗Actit is displayed.
The interaction term in columns 1 and 2 (columns 3 and 4) is a dummy for the interaction of
being a lowest-third student in math (English) and being in the post-accountability era. Standard
errors are clustered at the school-year level in parentheses. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table A3: Policy Interaction on Students: Placebo
Test Scores Absences Suspension
Panel A: Math-lowest-third
Low*Ret*Act -0.0041 -0.49 -0.0057
(0.025) (0.40) (0.0094)
Panel B: English-lowest-third
Low*Ret*Act 0.037 0.32 0.014
(0.022) (0.41) (0.010)
Observations 90,916 90,916 90,916
Notes: All regressions implement specification 1.4 for the years between 2003 and 2007 and focus
on students exempt from the retention policy. The coefficient of the triple-interaction term
Lowist′ ∗Actit ∗RetPoligt is displayed. The triple-interaction term is a dummy for the triple
interaction of being a lowest-third student in math or English, being in post-accountability era,
and being subject to the retention policy. Standard errors are clustered at the school-year level in
parentheses. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Table A4: Policy Interaction on Teachers
Math English
Experience Absences Experience Absences
Low*Ret*Act 0.059 -0.067 -0.11 -0.15
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Observations 1,110,237 1,095,866 1,111,176 1,096,305
Notes: All regressions implement specification 1.4. The coefficient of the triple-interaction term
Lowist′ ∗Actit ∗RetPoligt is displayed. The triple-interaction term is a dummy for the triple
interaction of being a lowest-third student in math or English, being in post-accountability era,
and being subject to the retention policy. Standard errors are clustered at the school-year level in
parentheses.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table A5: Policy Interaction on Students: Accountability Robustness
Test Scores Absences Suspension
Panel A: Math-lowest-third
Low*Ret*Act 0.27∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ -0.0066∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.089) (0.0019)
Panel B: English-lowest-third
Low*Ret*Act 0.071∗∗∗ -0.14 -0.0040∗
(0.0052) (0.084) (0.0019)
Observations 1,155,107 1,155,107 1,155,107
Notes: All regressions implement specification 1.4, including year-specific covariates of being a
citywide lowest-third student, categorical dummies of ethnicity groups, and an indicator of having
prior test scores between 2.5 and 3.5. The coefficient of the triple-interaction term
Lowist′ ∗Actit ∗RetPoligt is displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the school-year level in
parentheses. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Table A6: Policy Interaction on Students: High-Achieving Schools
Test Scores Absences Suspension
Panel A: Math-lowest-third
GenEd*Low*Ret*Act 0.022 -0.52 -0.0089
(0.061) (0.87) (0.020)
Observations 227,649 227,649 227,649
Panel B: English-lowest-third
GenEd*Low*Ret*Act -0.052 -0.97 0.0060
(0.060) (0.95) (0.024)
Observations 231,714 231,714 231,714
Notes: All regressions focus on students in schools with average test scores above the 75th
percentile and implement specification 1.4 interacting with an indicator of being a general
education student who is subject to the retention policy. The coefficient of the triple-interaction
term Lowist′ ∗Actit ∗RetPoligt interacting with the indicator of being a general education student
is displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the school-year level in parentheses. * p < .05, **
p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year control
functions of student’s index score and survey grade fixed effects. [placebo] stands for coef-
ficients on current outcome and [future] stands for coefficients on the average outcome in
the next three years after tests. We include students who were in 8th grade or tested in
school year 2009-2010 in addition to our main RD sample.









Retention [l = 1] -1.477 10.40*(3.429) (5.897)
Retention [l = 2] 4.196 9.618*(3.386) (4.938)
Retention [l = 3] 5.192 5.078(3.737) (4.842)
Observations 189,807 395,442
R-squared. 0.044 0.011
Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year con-
trol functions of student’s index score and survey grade fixed effects. [placebo] stands for
coefficients on current outcome and [l = 1, 2, 3] stands for coefficients on next-year, two-
year-later, and three-year-later outcomes, respectively. We include students who were in
8th grade or tested in school year 2009-2010 in addition to our main RD sample.
168























Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year control
functions of student’s index score and survey grade fixed effects. [placebo] stands for coef-
ficients on current outcome and [future] stands for coefficients on the average outcome in
the next three years after tests. We include students who were in 8th grade or tested in
school year 2009-2010 in addition to our main RD sample.
Table A10: An Example of Data Stacking
ID Test Year Test Grade Index Failing a test Retention Survey Year Survey Grade
1 2007 5 -3 1 1 2007 5
1 2007 5 -3 1 1 2008 5
1 2007 5 -3 1 1 2009 6
1 2007 5 -3 1 1 2010 7
Notes: In this example, a student with identification number 1 was in 5th grade in 2007,
took the tests that year, failed the English exam by 3 points, passed the math exam, and was
retained. This record is matched to his/her survey response in 2007, which was collected
before this student knew his/her test scores and the retention decision, and also matched
to survey responses in 2008, 2009, and 2010. Since the test year is the same, his test scores,
and therefore the running variable, do not change. His survey grade reflects his grade when
he took the survey each year. Because he was retained in 2007, his survey grade is the same
in 2008 as in 2007.
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Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year control
functions of student’s index score. [placebo] stands for coefficients on current outcome and
[future] stands for coefficients on the average outcome in the next three years after tests.
Test Scores are normalized within each grade × year to have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one. ELA stands for the English Language Arts exam. Absences are capped
at 50 days per year and suspension is an indicator for being suspended at least once during
the school year.
Table A12: Effects on Survey Responses by Bandwidths















0.809 0.731 -1.352 -2.113 -1.778 -1.045
(6.047) (4.387) (4.045) (3.741) (3.512) (3.358)
Retention
[future]
7.474*** 6.499*** 4.678** 5.726*** 4.669*** 4.107***
(2.750) (2.112) (1.889) (1.728) (1.586) (1.489)
Observations 130,540 199,393 237,672 279,677 325,712 375,863















-6.382 -5.976* -5.822* -4.093 -2.631 -1.732
(4.526) (3.531) (3.262) (3.034) (2.878) (2.751)
Retention
[future]
6.144** 5.832** 4.512** 4.735** 4.492** 4.758***
(3.075) (2.344) (2.126) (1.955) (1.809) (1.696)
Observations 248,425 369,328 432,809 499,647 570,109 643,937
R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.012
Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year control
functions of student’s index score and survey grade fixed effects. [placebo] stands for coef-
ficients on current outcome and [future] stands for coefficients on the average outcome in
the next three years after tests. First row stands for our choice of the bandwidth of the
index score near the cutoff.
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Table A13: Effects of Retention with Two-way Clustering






-0.00597 0.00129 -0.409 -0.00369 0.235 -6.091**
(0.0401) (0.0359) (1.029) (0.0138) (3.169) (2.854)
Retention
[future]
0.546*** 0.629*** 0.533 0.0481*** 5.138** 6.133**
(0.0396) (0.0498) (1.325) (0.0162) (2.377) (3.023)
Observations 939,661 939,962 945,555 945,555 163,594 307,465
R-squared. 0.190 0.214 0.035 0.021 0.042 0.008
Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year control
functions of student’s index score (and survey grade fixed effects for last two columns).
[placebo] stands for coefficients on current outcome and [future] stands for coefficients on
the average outcome in the next three years after tests. Test Scores are normalized within
each grade × year to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. ELA stands for
the English Language Arts exam. Absences are capped at 50 days per year and suspension
is an indicator for being suspended at least once during the school year. Some estimates in
this table are different from previous ones because two-way clustering is only implementable
under ivreg2 in Stata and we use ivregress in previous analysis. Some anecdotes suggest
ivreg2 has some algorithm issues that may cause the discrepancies. In most cases in our
analysis, the two estimates from ivreg2 and ivregress are very close.
Table A14: Persistent Effects of Retention with Two-way Clustering






-0.00597 0.00129 0.235 -6.091**
(0.0401) (0.0359) (3.169) (2.854)
Retention [l = 1] 0.664*** 0.788*** -1.229 11.72(0.0594) (0.0657) (3.602) (7.198)
Retention [l = 2] 0.447*** 0.497*** 4.761 9.672(0.0405) (0.0691) (3.239) (6.188)
Retention [l = 3] 0.362*** 0.386*** 4.314 7.559(0.0782) (0.0832) (3.081) (5.979)
Observations 939,661 939,962 163,594 307,481
R-squared. 0.194 0.215 0.044 0.012
Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year control
functions of student’s index score (and survey grade fixed effects for last two columns).
[placebo] stands for coefficients on current outcome and [l = 1, 2, 3] stands for coefficients
on next-year, two-year-later, and three-year-later outcomes, respectively. Test Scores are
normalized within each grade × year to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
one. ELA stands for the English Language Arts exam. Some estimates in this table are
different from previous ones because two-way clustering is only implementable under ivreg2
in Stata and we use ivregress in previous analysis. Some anecdotes suggest ivreg2 has some
algorithm issues that may cause the discrepancies. In most cases in our analysis, the two
estimates from ivreg2 and ivregress are very close.
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Table A15: Effects of Retention by Policies with Two-way Clustering






-0.00566 0.00378 -0.211 -5.961**
(0.0417) (0.0377) (3.209) (2.911)
Pre-Policy
Retention [placebo]
-0.0109 -0.0376 10.63 -8.385
(0.146) (0.0896) (19.19) (14.57)
Post-Policy
Retention [future]
0.537*** 0.625*** 5.495** 6.512**
(0.0418) (0.0524) (2.403) (3.107)
Pre-Policy
Retention [future]
0.672*** 0.674*** -7.617 -8.939
(0.119) (0.145) (10.45) (11.14)
Observations 939,661 939,962 163,594 307,481
R-squared. 0.186 0.212 0.038 0.006
Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year control
functions of student’s index score (and survey grade fixed effects for last two columns).
[placebo] stands for coefficients on current outcome and [future] stands for coefficients on
the average outcome in the next three years after tests. Test Scores are normalized within
each grade × year to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. ELA stands for
the English Language Arts exam. Some estimates in this table are different from previous
ones because two-way clustering is only implementable under ivreg2 in Stata and we use
ivregress in previous analysis. Some anecdotes suggest ivreg2 has some algorithm issues
that may cause the discrepancies. In most cases in our analysis, the two estimates from
ivreg2 and ivregress are very close.













Retention [placebo] 0.217 0.220 0.235 -6.263 -6.251 -6.091(5.023) (5.026) (5.025) (3.936) (3.931) (3.935)
Retention [future] 5.749* 7.170** 6.767** 7.881** 9.260** 9.234**(3.164) (3.220) (3.216) (3.583) (3.920) (3.917)
Tenure at School Yes No No Yes No No
School Type No Yes No No Yes No
Special Education No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 136,852 122,322 122,439 239,732 213,162 213,372
R-squared 0.041 0.038 0.039 0.009 0.005 0.005
Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with grade × year control
functions of student’s index score, survey grade fixed effects, and additional covariates as
indicated in the table. [placebo] stands for coefficients on current outcome and [future]
stands for coefficients on the average outcome in the next three years after tests. First row
stands for our choice of the bandwidth of the index score near the cutoff.
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Table A17: CIA Test
Variable Parental Satisfaction Students’ Personal Safety
Right Left Right Left
Index Score 0.00340 0.00472 0.225*** 0.267***
(0.0491) (0.0921) (0.0400) (0.0736)
Observations 37,186 9,402 98,965 24,675
R-squared. 0.030 0.035 0.012 0.013
Note: Each column reports coefficients from regressing parental satisfaction and student
safety on pre-determined covariates and the index score. Column two and four (three and
five) restrict the sample to observations at the right (left) of cutoff.
Table A18: Continuity of Covariates Test
Variables Female Native Hispanic Stay Parent Resp Density
Failure 0.000710 -0.000397 -0.00509 0.000320 -0.00290 -0.0201
(0.00526) (0.000812) (0.00514) (0.00294) (0.00491) (0.0164)
Observations 437,420 437,420 437,420 342,828 437,420 11
R-squared 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.148 1
Variables Asian Black White Free lunch Student Resp
Failure 0.00421* -0.00118 0.00244 -0.00292 -0.00691
(0.00217) (0.00525) (0.00265) (0.00268) (0.00486)
Observations 437,420 437,420 437,420 424,060 437,420
R-squared 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.191
Note: Each column reports coefficients from a single regression with controls for student’s
index score. Stay stands for appearing in the datasets next year and Parent (Student) Resp
stands for whether the parent (student) ever responded to the surveys.
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